Intervention and Post-Conflict Natural Resource Governance: Lessons from Liberia by Whittemore, Luke A.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Journal of International Law
2008
Intervention and Post-Conflict Natural Resource
Governance: Lessons from Liberia
Luke A. Whittemore
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota
Journal of International Law collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Whittemore, Luke A., "Intervention and Post-Conflict Natural Resource Governance: Lessons from Liberia" (2008). Minnesota Journal
of International Law. 36.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil/36
Cite as: 17 MINN. J. INT'L L. 387 (2008)
Intervention and Post-Conflict Natural
Resource Governance: Lessons from
Liberia
Luke A. Whittemore*
'T]he most important consideration at the peace table will
be the question of allocation and ownership of resources. Indeed,
world peace hinges upon our answer to that question."
George Renner'
I. INTRODUCTION
Regardless of whether George Renner was correct in his
analysis of the World War II peace process, his connection
between resolving natural resource issues and sustaining peace
in post-conflict societies was prescient. While the conflicts of
today's world are not of the scale of yesterday's world wars, and
increasingly involve military interventions in civil war, the
consideration of natural resources in the peace process is even
more critical. Indeed, establishing effective post-conflict natural
* Lieutenant, United States Navy. The positions and opinions stated in this article
are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the United
States Government, the Department of Defense, or the United States Navy.
Lieutenant Whittemore is an active duty Naval Officer enrolled at Georgetown
University Law Center (J.D. 2008). He holds a Masters of Science in Economic and
Social History (2003) and a Masters of Science in Environmental Change and
Management (2002) from the University of Oxford, England. He obtained a
Bachelors of Science with distinction in Honors Oceanography from the U.S. Naval
Academy (2001) and qualified as a surface warfare officer aboard USS SAN
JACINTO (CG 56). The author would like to thank his wife, Laurie, for her love and
support, and also would like to thank Professor Jane Stromseth at Georgetown
University Law Center for her valuable insights and comments.
1. George T. Renner, Natural Resources in the Post-War World, 49 AM. J. SOC.
430, 430 (1944) (writing about resolution of natural resource issues for a post-World
War II global society).
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resource governance is essential to maintaining stability and
peace after military interventions.
Violent internal conflicts, or civil wars, were frequent
throughout the world in the 1980s and 1990s,2 and while some
of these conflicts have been suspended or repressed in the past
ten years, the potential for continued civil war and societal
collapse remains.' Despite the gradual rejection of colonialism
in favor of self-determination after World War II, military
intervention by foreign governments in civil wars has increased
in the last two decades.4 Whether these interventions are
justified for humanitarian, national and international security,
or other reasons, once the intervention occurs, the foreign states
have played a large role working to establish the rule of law and
a lasting peace. This role has enlarged in the last decade, with
the intervening states or organizations becoming increasingly
involved in the whole or partial administration of the society in
crisis.'
The factors in effectively administering a post-conflict
society are varied, but the importance of natural resources
cannot be overlooked. Natural resource issues have played a
significant role in numerous civil wars over the past few
decades.6 The centrality of this role in the initiation and
continuance of conflict has been the source of recent scholarly
debate. From the econometric work of Paul Collier and Anke
Hoeffler emerged a distinction between greed and grievance
models for civil war initiation.7 Collier and Hoeffler's studies
found that primary commodity exports were the most important
2. MONTY G. MARSHALL & TED ROBERT GURR, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT & CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, PEACE AND CONFLICT 2005: A GLOBAL
SURVEY OF ARMED CONFLICTS, SELF-DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS, AND DEMOCRACY
13 (2005).
3. Id. at 2 (classifying thirty-one countries in serious risk of succumbing to
civil war or governmental collapse, and indicating that another fifty-one countries
display some factors associated with this serious risk group).
4. JANE STROMSETH ET AL., CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? BUILDING THE RULE OF
LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 1-2 (2006).
5. See id. at 63.
6. See, e.g., PHILIPPE LE BILLON, FUELLING WAR: NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ARMED CONFLICT 36 tbl. 2 (2005); MICHAEL T. KLARE, RESOURCE WARS: THE NEW
LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL CONFLICT 208 (2001); Michael Ross, The Natural Resource
Curse: How Wealth Can Make You Poor, in NATURAL RESOURCES AND VIOLENT
CONFLICT: OPTIONS AND ACTIONS 17-18 (Ian Bannon & Paul Collier eds., 2003);
Richard Snyder, Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder? A Political Economy of
Extraction Framework, 39 COMP. POL. STUD. 943, 945-46 tbl. 1 (2006).
7. See Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, Abstract, On Economic Causes of Civil
War, 50 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 563 (1998).
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factor in predicting civil war.8 From these results arose a greed
or utilitarian model of conflict. Instead of ethnic divisions and
unjust regimes driving conflict (the grievance model), the
availability of lootable resources, such as alluvial diamonds and
timber, provided the underlying motivation for rebellions.'
While Collier and Hoeffler refined the greed model over time,"° a
number of scholars have questioned the purely economic focus of
the model, instead bringing political structures and natural
resource governance back into the picture." Other research
emphasized that considering the different characteristics and
locations of natural resources is critical to understanding civil
war initiation and continuation. 2 Despite the recent critiques
and qualifications of the greed model, there is a growing
recognition that natural resource abundance and
mismanagement can create conditions ripe for civil war.
Ensuring that resource-rich post-conflict societies regain
stability and sustain their peace in the aftermath of a military
intervention requires a comprehensive approach to natural
resource governance. Intervening states and organizations that
seek to promote stability must integrate natural resource
considerations into every phase of the intervention. Pre-
intervention planning should include study and analysis of the
state's natural resource characteristics, effective management of
international resource sanction regimes, and development of a
viable blueprint for immediate post-conflict resource
management. Immediately after intervention, security must be
established with natural resources in mind, thus giving the
transitional government effective control over its resources and
preventing remaining rebels from using those resources to
continue conflict. In promoting effective internal governance
and the rule of law, legislative reform must clearly delineate
public and private ownership over resources. Transparent and
independent regimes will need to be established for tracking
8. See Paul Collier, Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective, in GREED
AND GRIEVANCE: ECONOMIC AGENDAS IN CIVIL WARS 91 (Mats Berdal & David M.
Malone eds., 2000).
9. See id. at 106.
10. See, e.g., Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, Resource Rents, Governance, and
Conflict, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 625, 625 (2005); Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, Greed
and Grievance in Civil War, 56 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 563, 563-64 (2004).
11. See, e.g., James Ron, Paradigm in Distress? Primary Commodities and Civil
War, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 443, 443-44 (2005) (introducing a special issue of the
Journal of Conflict Resolution discussing the link between primary commodities,
political instability, and civil war); Snyder, supra note 6, at 946-47.
12. See LE BILLON, supra note 6, at 31.
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resource exploitation and controlling corruption. Working with
local leaders, interveners must provide adequate funds and
infrastructure to build and maintain local and regional natural
resource institutions. Economic reform, both internally and
internationally, must allow for diversification of the economy
and reduce incentives for spoilers. Finally, international legal
structures must be in place to independently assist and prod the
post-conflict state into peaceful transition. This includes a
possible continuation of the sanction regime, processes for
natural resource tracking and verification (such as the
Kimberley Process) and controls on multinational corporations
trading in resources with the state. While the scope of this
article will be limited to only a few of these areas, all of them
are crucial.
Using Liberia as an example, this article will emphasize the
importance of establishing effective natural resource governance
after international military interventions. Part II will analyze
the connection between natural resources and conflict. Part III
will introduce Liberia's recent experiences in civil war and state
failure. Part IV will discuss Liberia's natural resource situation
and analyze the failures and successes in Liberia's post-conflict
natural resource governance, which suggest a number of lessons
for the future.
II. NATURAL RESOURCES AND CIVIL WARS
A. IS THERE A LINK BETWEEN RESOURCE WEALTH AND CONFLICT?
Stating that there is a connection between natural
resources and a country's development is not a novel or
controversial idea. Scholars have been debating for centuries
whether natural resource abundance is a boon or a curse to the
possessor country. 3 However, recent research focuses on the
relation between violent conflict and natural resource
endowments. 4 Understanding this research and the relative
13. See generally Michael L. Ross, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse,
51 WORLD POL. 297 (1999) (providing a review of the recent literature on natural
resource abundance and economic development).
14. See generally, e.g., Paivi Lujala et al., A Diamond Curse? Civil War and a
Lootable Resource, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 538 (2005) (finding that the production of
lootable diamonds increases the risk of onset of ethnic war); Ola Olsson, Conflict
Diamonds, 82 J. DEV. ECON. 267 (2007) (concluding that diamond abundance has a
negative relationship with economic growth in countries with weak institutions);
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connection between civil war and a country's resources is a
prerequisite to proper post-conflict peacekeeping.
The centrality of natural resources in initiating and
prolonging civil wars is controversial. A common understanding
of civil wars is that such conflicts start from grievances of
individuals within the country, either against another group in
the country or against the government. 5 However, recent
research challenges this assumption, arguing that rebellions
arise from rebels' greed over exploiting natural resource
wealth. 6  This general greed versus grievance framework
provides a starting point, but vastly simplifies the complex
interactions between natural resources, rebels, conflict, and the
effectiveness of central governments.
In determining the importance of greed to civil war,
scholars developed econometric models using civil war initiation
or duration as the dependent variable. The models then
explored various independent variables that could represent
greed and grievance factors. For example, Paul Collier and
Anke Hoeffler's early studies used three proxies to capture the
economic agenda or greed factors (with the intended factor in
parentheses): primary commodity exports (natural resource
endowments), proportion of young men in society (cost of
attracting recruits to the rebellion), and average years of
education (other income-earning opportunities). As proxies for
grievance factors, Collier and Hoeffler used indices for societal
fractionalization (ethnic or religious hatred), ownership of land
(economic inequalities), indices of political rights (lack of
political rights), and recent rate of growth per capita
(government economic incompetence). 8 Collier and Hoeffler's
Indra de Soysa, The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paucity?,
in GREED AND GRIEVANCE: ECONOMIC AGENDAS IN CIVIL WARS (Mats Berdal &
David M. Malone eds., 2000) (finding that an abundance of a country's mineral
wealth is positively and significantly related to internal armed conflict); Collier,
supra note 8 (highlighting the link between exports of primary commodities and the
origins of civil war); Collier & Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, supra
note 10 (finding that primary commodity exports significantly increase conflict risk);
Ross, supra note 6 (describing how an abundance of primary commodities, such as
minerals, drugs, and timber, increases the risk of civil war); Snyder, supra note 6
(analyzing the relationship between lootable wealth (e.g., gems, timber, drugs) and
disorder).
15. See Paul Collier, The Market for Civil War, FOREIGN POL'Y, May-Jun. 2003,
at 38, 40-41.
16. See Collier, supra note 8, at 91.
17. Id. at 93-95.
18. Id. at 95-96.
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models found that the presence of primary commodity exports
greatly increases the risk of civil war, exceeding any other greed
or grievance factor. 9 These results indicate that where the
perceived economic benefits from violence outweigh those from
peace, civil war is more likely. ° Collier and Hoeffler's findings
departed from the standard approach focusing on political
variables such as ethnic divisions, regime stability, history,
political legitimacy, state strength, and income equality.2'
Collier and Hoeffler are not the only scholars to approach
the issue, nor are their results unquestioned. The broader issue
of natural resource abundance, economic growth, and
governance, which directly relates to conditions for internal
conflict, is found throughout literature before and after Collier
and Hoeffler's studies. 2   While there is dispute as to the
centrality and relative effect of natural resource abundance to
civil wars, most of the literature recognizes that natural
resources play some role in influencing the initiation and
duration of violent internal conflicts.
B. WHAT IS THE LINK BETWEEN NATURAL RESOURCES AND
CONFLICT?
It is common to think that many conflicts are caused by a
scarcity of natural resources. As global population and demand
grow, the scarcity of natural resources, especially oil and water,
can be a large factor in creating conditions ripe for violent
conflict. 3 A leading scarcity and internal conflict perspective
focuses on two mechanisms through which natural resource
scarcity acts to prevent socio-economic innovation and
perpetuate underdevelopment: (1) scarcity encourages powerful
groups-elites-within a society to "capture" resources,
therefore marginalizing others in the process; and, (2) scarcity
overwhelms efforts to promote social and economic innovation,
therefore increasing grievances and eroding the authority of the
19. Id. at 97.
20. Id. at 103-04; see also Ron, supra note 11, at 444.
21. See, e.g., Collier, supra note 15, at 40-41; Collier, supra note 8, at 91-92;
Ron, supra note 11, at 444; de Soysa, supra note 14, at 115-16.
22. See, e.g., Macartan Humphreys, Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict
Resolution, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 508, 511-18 (2005); LE BILLON, supra note 6, at
11-24; de Soysa, supra note 14, at 114-22; Olsson, supra note 14, at 267-69; Ron,
supra note 11, at 444-45; Ross, supra note 6, at 19-22.
23. See, e.g., KLARE, supra note 6, at 15-26; SANDRA POSTEL, LAST OASIS:
FACING WATER SCARCITY 73-86 (1992); MARQ DE VILLIERS, WATER WARS: IS THE
WORLD'S WATER RUNNING OUT? 20-21 (1999).
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government. 4 While this approach to civil wars is useful to
understanding possible mechanisms involving countries with
scarce resources, recent interventions-including Liberia as
discussed in Part III-have occurred in countries with an
abundance of some kind of natural resource. Additionally,
recent studies find little evidence that scarcity of resources
drives conflicts, instead focusing on the significance of resource
abundance.25  The theory that natural resource abundance
results in poor governance and economic underperformance is
often termed the "resource curse. '"26
Under the resource curse theory, natural resource
dependence heightens the risk of armed conflict through four
groups of mechanisms: effects on the economy, governments,
groups within the state, and outsiders.
1. Economies and Natural Resources
Economic effects can be divided into a reduction in growth
and an increase in poverty and inequality. On average,
resource-dependent countries consistently experience lower
economic growth rates than resource-poor countries. 7 This
lower growth rate is often explained through the Dutch Disease
theory, where resourcedependence results in a failure to
diversify and innovate in an economy.2' Because of the
availability of natural resources for ready capital, the state has
little incentive to allocate capital, labor, and innovation to other
industries. 29 The country is therefore much more vulnerable to
international commodity price instability, which in turn has
both microeconomic and macroeconomic effects that jeopardize
24. de Soysa, supra note 14, at 117-18.
25. See de Soysa, supra note 14, at 124.
26. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 6, at 17; de Soysa, supra note 14, at 113.
27. LE BILLON, supra note 6, at 11; Ross, supra note 6, at 20. There are a
number of ways to measure resource dependence and abundance: One approach
considers a resource-dependent country as having a large ratio of natural resource
exports to GDP-essentially the country relies on natural resources, as opposed to
other sectors such as manufactured/finished goods, for a large part of its national
revenues. See, e.g., Ross supra note 6, at 21 tbl. 2.4. Another way of portraying
abundance of resources is through a measure of natural resource stock per capital.
See de Soysa, supra note 14, at 122 (arguing that this measure is a better proxy for
determining abundance and scarcity of natural resources within a country).
28. See, e.g., LE BILLON, supra note 6, at 19; de Soysa, supra note 14, at 120-
21.
29. LE BILLON, supra note 6, at 19; de Soysa, supra note 14, at 120.
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development.3" Lower rates of growth and vulnerability to price
shocks correlate to higher probabilities of unconstitutional
political change.3" The failure to diversify into a manufacturing
sector, which could dampen price shocks, also results in what
Humphreys calls the sparse networks mechanism.32 Under this
mechanism, a weak manufacturing sector results in
correspondingly low levels of internal trade. This both
fragments the economy into independent enclaves of production
and limits cooperation, understanding, and information sharing,
therefore raising conflict risks.33
Resource dependence tends to result in greater poverty and
inequality, consequences that form the grievances that often
influence civil wars. For example, reliance on mineral exports is
correlated with high poverty rates, high child mortality rates,
poor education, lower life expectancy, and greater income
inequality.34 Groups suffering from poverty, income equality,
and vulnerability to trade shocks are more likely to rise up
against their government-numerous studies demonstrate that
the greater a country's poverty, the greater the likelihood of civil
war. 35  Therefore, grievance mechanisms can arise through
resource dependence.
2. Governance and Natural Resources
Resource dependence also has a significant effect on politics
and the quality of governance. Ineffective governments are not
able to effectively resolve conflicts before they result in violence,
and the governments may often exacerbate those conflicts.36
30. See Patrick Guillaumont & Sylviane Guillaumont Jeanneney, Dampening
Price Shocks, in NATURAL RESOURCES AND VIOLENT CONFLICT: OPTIONS AND
ACTIONS 354-55 (Ian Bannon & Paul Collier eds., 2003).
31. Collier & Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance, supra note 10, at 569;
Guillaumont & Jeanneney, supra note 30, at 355.
32. Humphreys, supra note 22, at 513.
33. Id.; see also de Soysa, supra note 14, at 120 (explaining that innovation
progresses more rapidly in the manufacturing sector because that sector is linkage-
strong).
34. LE BILLON, supra note 6, at 11-12; Ross, supra note 6, at 20.
35. Ross, supra note 6, at 20-21.
36. See, e.g., STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 4, at 137-40; Ross, supra note 6, at
25; David Keen, Incentives and Disincentives for Violence, in GREED AND GRIEVANCE:
ECONOMIC AGENDAS IN CIVIL WARS 26-29 (Mats Berdal & David M. Malone eds.,
2000). Failed and weak government institutions have significantly contributed to
violence in a number of states. For example, Somalia's weak regime was easily
overthrown in 1991, quickly resulting in anarchy and violent civil war. See
STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 4, at 139, 156; Jeffery Clark, Debacle in Somalia:
[Vol. 17:2
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Three complementary mechanisms each make internal conflict
over natural resources more likely: weak governments,
corruption, and unaccountability.37
The weak states mechanism theorizes that resource
dependence weakens state structures, making the country less
able to provide public goods and resolve social conflicts. 8  In
many resource dependent countries, the primary source of
capital for the state is typically from resource export revenues,
and not from taxation of the public. 9 Weak states generally
arise from resource dependence in two ways: less societal control
over government and less government control over society." In
the first variation, citizens who do not bear the burden of
taxation have less power over the government.4 Those citizens
have less information about government activities, a lesser
interest in demanding accountability for those spending their
tax monies, and fewer measures at their disposal to withdraw
support from a government with which they disagree. 2 The
second variation focuses on weakened state control.
Governments that rely on resource revenues rather than taxes
have less incentive to create strong bureaucratic institutions
that could better conduct country-wide social and economic
planning and effectively prevent or intervene in social conflicts. 3
The corruption mechanism focuses on greed at the
government leadership level. When a government derives more
of its capital from natural resources, it is more likely to
Failure of the Collective Response, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE
INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 207-12 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993).
The violence in Sierra Leone in the 1990s was exacerbated by the inability of any
central government to deal with rebel forces; instead, the weak government either
was overthrown or joined with the rebels. See STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 4, at
158-59; W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Sierra Leone, in DEALING WITH CONFLICT IN AFRICA:
THE UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 128-37 (Jane Bolden ed.,
2003); NORRIE MACQUEEN, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA SINCE 1960
180-91 (A.J. Nicholls & Martin S. Alexander eds., 2002). See Part III of this article
for a description of Liberia's government failures.
37. Ross, supra note 6, at 24-25.
38. Id. at 25.
39. Nathan Jensen & Leonard Wantchekon, Resource Wealth and Political
Regimes in Africa, 37 COMP. POL. STUD. 816, 817 (2004).
40. See Humphreys, supra note 22, at 512.
41. See id.; Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and People's Ownership of
Natural Resources in International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 33, 71 (2006).
42. See, e.g., Duruigbo, supra note 41, at 70-72 (2006); Humphreys, supra note
22, at 512.
43. See, e.g., Duruigbo, supra note 41, at 72; James D. Fearon, Primary
Commodity Exports and Civil War, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 483, 487 (2005);
Humphreys, supra note 22, at 512; Ross, supra note 6, at 25.
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experience corruption." It is difficult for many governments to
effectively manage large amounts of revenue. 5  Therefore,
coupled with the weak states mechanism, resource dependent
governments are unable or unwilling to track all the revenues
from resources, thereby enabling corruption. The results of
corruption may be disastrous for the country's economy, the
legitimacy of its rulers, and the quality of its governance,
leading to high levels of inequality and raising strong grievances
against the government.'
Reduced accountability is tied to both the weak states
mechanism and corruption. Often termed the "rentier-state"
effect, the availability of large resource revenues allows the
government to pursue politics of patronage and build up
internal security forces to quell dissent, therefore undermining
the possibility of democratic governance. 7  The lack of
innovation and diversification that occurs in resource dependent
states also extends to a lack of social capital and political
modernization.48 Resource dependence is associated with a
lower level of democracy, especially in Africa. 9 Corruption also
serves to reduce accountability through government officials
who favor and listen only to those who can afford to pay bribes. °
44. See, e.g., Duruigbo, supra note 41, at 74; Ross, supra note 6, at 24.
45. Ross, supra note 6, at 24.
46. See LE BILLON, supra note 6, at 22.
47. See, e.g., de Soysa, supra note 14, at 121; LE BILLON, supra note 6, at 21;
Ross, supra note 6, at 25.
48. See LE BILLON, supra note 6, at 21.
49. See Jensen & Wantchekon, supra note 39, at 817-18, 834-36. Jensen and
Wantchekon find that natural resource abundance has a significant negative impact
on democratic consolidation in Africa. Id. at 818. This is because "resource
abundance allows incumbent politicians to maintain support and consolidate their
hold on political power" through the profits or "rents" gained from the trade of
natural resources. Id. at 819. For example, in the Republic of the Congo
(Brazzaville), leaders used oil revenues to consolidate political power in the late 20th
century. See id. at 820. Burma's government has retained absolute control of the
country since 1990 by controlling the trade in natural resources such as drugs, gems,
and timber. See Snyder, supra note 6, at 959-62; GLOBAL WITNESS, LOGS OF WAR:
THE TIMBER TRADE AND ARMED CONFLICT 28-33 (2002), available at
http://www.globalwitness.org/medialibrary-get.php/150/0203-The%20Logs%20of%2
OWar-by%20GWFafo.pdf; Peter S. Goodman & Peter Finn, Corruption Stains
Timber Trade, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2007, at Al. As described in Part III, Charles
Taylor used revenues from the timber, diamond, and rubber trade to gain and then
maintain authoritarian power. See, e.g., STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 4, at 100-01;
GLOBAL WITNESS, LOGS OF WAR, supra note 49, at 22-26; Jamie O'Connell, Here
Interest Meets Humanity: How to End War and Support Reconstruction in Liberia,
and the Case for Modest American Leadership, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 207, 214-16
(2004).
50. Ross, supra note 6, at 25.
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Studies find a strong link between decreased
accountability/democracy and an increased risk of conflict."
3. Internal Actors and Natural Resources
The third general effect of resource dependence is on groups
within the country, especially on potential rebel groups. Under
a greedy rebels mechanism, the availability of exploitable
natural resources creates incentives for domestic groups to
engage in quasi-criminal activity to benefit from these resources
outside of state control. 2 Either through direct extraction and
sale of the resources or through extracting rents from those
engaged in extraction, domestic groups can gain access to a
large revenue stream. 3 If those potential revenues are greater
than the group is receiving or could receive in peace, a strong
incentive exists to start or prolong conflict that will enable
private access to the resources. 4 The concentration of natural
resources in a particular region can also give people who live in
that region an incentive to form a separate state and a belief
that the state would be viable through resource revenues,
therefore increasing the risk of secessionist conflict." Rebel
groups with potential access to resources can also finance
rebellion through the sale of future exploitation rights, or "booty
futures," to resource companies.56 This allows an aspiring rebel
group that has not yet captured valuable resources to obtain
funds to support the rebellion. 7 Therefore, through sale of booty
futures, conflict that might not otherwise occur is now much
more likely to occur. Additionally, when resource firms already
exist in the country, rebels can obtain money through the
extortion and kidnapping of the workers of those firms. 8
4. External Actors and Natural Resources
Finally, resource dependence can increase the incentives for
51. Collier & Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance, supra note 10, at 576; Ross, supra
note 6, at 26.
52. Humphreys, supra note 22, at 511.
53. Ross, supra note 6, at 30-34.
54. See, e.g., Collier, supra note 15, at 41-42.
55. LE BILLON, supra note 6, at 39-40; Humphreys, supra note 22, at 511; Ross,
supra note 6, at 27-28.
56. Humphreys, supra note 22, at 512; Ross, supra note 6, at 32.
57. Ross, supra note 6, at 32-33.
58. Id. at 33-34.
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other states and corporations to engage in or foster conflict
within that state, the greedy outsiders mechanism. 9 This
mechanism is very similar to the rebel greed mechanism, except
that it involves the perceived benefits for a foreign state or
multinational corporation to intervene in or initiate a civil war.6"
Resource availability can offer self-financing of an intervention
and potentially lucrative opportunities for occupying troops.6'
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES
All natural resources are not equal in their potential to
cause conflict. Collier and Hoeffler's primary commodity export
variable reflects mostly cash crops and oil exports;62 however, it
seems likely that different resources would influence conflict
outcomes in different ways. This is in fact the case-the type
and characteristics of natural resources affect the balance of
power between groups competing for those resources.63 Non-
renewable resource abundance or mineral wealth shows greater
significance in conflict initiation than renewable resources, such
as water and agriculture.' Some mineral wealth, such as oil
reserves, may not be able to provide the financing for rebel
groups because control of those resources requires a national
distribution system. Instead, an abundance of such reserves
may be tied to weaker state institutions and a higher conflict
risk.65
The majority of recent civil wars involved an abundance of
lootable resources.6 6  Lootable resources are defined as
59. Humphreys, supra note 22, at 511.
60. See, e.g., id.; John Bray, Attracting Reputable Companies to Risky
Environments: Petroleum and Mining Companies, in NATURAL RESOURCES AND
VIOLENT CONFLICT: OPTIONS AND ACTIONS 287-89 (Ian Bannon & Paul Collier eds.,
2003); Philippe Le Billon, Getting it Done: Instruments of Enforcement, in NATURAL
RESOURCES AND VIOLENT CONFLICT: OPTIONS AND ACTIONS 256-57 (Ian Bannon &
Paul Collier eds., 2003). For example, the De Beers Diamond Company, among
many other companies, participated in the trade of Angolan diamonds in violation of
a U.N. embargo in the 1990s, therefore providing money to the warring factions. See
Mungbalemwe Koyame, United Nations Resolutions and the Struggle to Curb the
Illicit Trade in Conflict Diamonds in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD. 80,
84-85 (2005).
61. LE BILLON, supra note 6, at 42.
62. Fearon, supra note 43, at 486.
63. LE BILLON, supra note 6, at 31.
64. See de Soysa, supra note 14, at 124; Fearon, supra note 43, at 487.
65. See Fearon, supra note 43, at 486-87.
66. A number of studies provide lists of resources involved in recent civil wars.
See, e.g., LE BILLON, supra note 6, at 36 tbl.2; Ross, supra note 6, at 18 tbl.2.1;
Snyder, supra note 6, at 945 tbl.1.
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"lucrative, easy-to-transport resources, such as gems, tropical
timber, and illicit drugs"67 or as "high-value goods with low
economic barriers to entry."6 Conversely, nonlootable resources
are goods with high barriers to entry, such as petroleum
reserves and deep-shaft minerals (e.g., Kimberlite diamond
deposits).69 A parallel concept is to think of resources as diffuse
or point. Diffuse resources are "exploited over wide areas
through a large number of small-scale operators."7  Point
resources are "exploited in small areas by a small number of
capital-intensive operators."1 Regardless of the terms used, the
accessibility of the resource matters. Diffuse or lootable
resources are exploited or controlled much more easily by rebel
groups than the government. Point or nonlootable resources
involve larger capital investment and often have a low value-to-
weight ratio, thereby making them ideally exploitable by
governments and not rebels.72 In a study distinguishing the
types of diamonds and conflict, alluvial diamonds are associated
with increased incidence of civil wars, while deep-shaft
diamonds (point) tend to make ethnic conflict less likely.73
While a government is less likely to be able to control
diffuse resources because of their dispersed nature, control is
not impossible. The location and mode of extraction of diffuse
resources can also influence the balance of power between
belligerents and the government. In reference to their location,
resources can be either proximate or distant. Proximate
resources are located in areas closer to government power
centers, and therefore are easier for the government to control.74
Distant resources are found in remote territories, in politically
contested areas, or near porous borders, thereby making the
resources more difficult for the government to control.75 Diffuse
resources that are located near a capital city and government
security forces will be more susceptible to government control
than those located further away. In reference to the mode of
extraction, diffuse resources can be obtained through artisanal
67. Snyder, supra note 6, at 943-44.
68. Richard Snyder & Ravi Bhavnani, Diamonds, Blood, and Taxes, 49 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 563, 565 (2005).
69. Id.
70. LE BILLON, supra note 6, at 32.
71. Id. at 34.
72. Id. at 35; Snyder & Bhavnani, supra note 68, at 568.
73. Lujala et al., supra note 14, at 539.
74. LE BILLON, supra note 6, at 35.
75. Id.
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and small-scale extraction76 or through industrial extraction
(point resources require industrial extraction)." If industrial
extraction of a diffuse resource is the dominant mode of
extraction (i.e., through a large timber or mining company), the
state can still control a large share of the income through taxes
on the industry."8
Resource characteristics do matter. The following list
summarizes the relation of accessibility, extraction, and location
of resources to the risk of civil war:79
Greatest Risk: Diffuse, distant resource involving
artisanal extraction;
Medium-High Risk: Diffuse, proximate resource involving
artisanal extraction;
Diffuse, distant resource involving industrial extraction:
Medium-Low Risk: Point, distant resource; and,
Low Risk: Point, proximate resource.
As this Part has shown, natural resources are important in
influencing the susceptibility of a society to civil war. While
natural resources are never the only source of conflict nor do
they make conflict inevitable, resource abundance and
dependence, especially involving diffuse resources, significantly
heightens the danger of violent conflict.
While many countries with an abundance of natural
resources have experienced instability and civil war, Liberia
provides an excellent example of how different natural resources
shaped the course of internal conflict and how a multinational
intervention has dealt with natural resource issues after
76. THOMAS HENTSCHEL ET. AL., ARTISANAL AND SMALL-SCALE MINING:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 5 (2003), available at http://www.iied.org/
mmsdlmmsd-pdfs/artisanal.pdf.
Broadly speaking, artisanal and small-scale mining refers to mining by
individuals, groups, families or cooperatives with minimal or no
mechanization, often in the informal (illegal) sector of the market . .. . In
some countries a distinction is made between 'artisanal mining' that is
purely manual and on a very small scale, and 'small-scale mining' that has
some mechanization and is on a larger scale. In some West African
countries ... small-scale mining is differentiated from artisanal mining by
the presence of permanent, fixed installations that are established once an
ore body is confirmed.
77. Snyder & Bhavnani, supra note 68, at 569.
78. Id.
79. See LE BILLON, supra note 6, at 31-35; Snyder, supra note 6, at 948-55;
Snyder & Bhavnani, supra note 68, at 568-70.
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intervention. Liberia's experience involves various natural
resources with different characteristics, therefore providing
examples of how these different characteristics actually
influence the exploitation of the resources during and after
conflict. Additionally, Liberia's experience is very recent, with
multinational stability operations still ongoing, therefore
providing a view into whether and how natural resource issues
influence modern post-conflict interventions and outcomes.
III. LIBERIA, CIVIL WAR, AND INTERVENTION
A. INITIAL INTERVENTION IN LIBERIA
Since 2003, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
has sought to bring greater stability to Liberia, and in the
process has addressed questions of natural resource
management. The U.N. Security Council established UNMIL in
September 2003,80 and recently extended its mandate to
September 2008.8" This multinational intervention is not the
first in Liberia, nor is the United Nations the only international
organization involved.
Civil war and intervention in Liberia trace back to
December 1989 and a rebellion led by Charles Taylor's National
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) to overthrow the repressive
government of Samuel Doe. As the insurgency spread, a lengthy
violent civil war ensued, resulting in the displacement of over
half of the country's 2.6 million people and thousands of horrific
deaths by the summer of 1990.82 The Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS)83 deployed the ECOWAS
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as a peacekeeping force to
Liberia in August 1990 to establish a cease-fire and stop Taylor
from gaining control of the capitol. Despite ECOMOG's
presence in Liberia and the establishment of an interim
government, a rebel faction killed Samuel Doe and the civil war
80. S.C. Res. 1509, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1509 (Sept. 19, 2003).
81. S.C. Res. 1777, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1777 (Sept. 20, 2007).
82. David Wippman, Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil
War, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS
157, 163 (Lori F. Damrosch ed., 1993).
83. The members of ECOWAS consist of: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde,
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. MACQUEEN, supra note 36, at 173
n.1.
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continued as ECOMOG confined itself to controlling only
Monrovia, leaving Taylor in control over the rest of the
country.'
The civil war crossed borders when Taylor's forces joined
with Sierra Leonean rebels and invaded the diamond-rich areas
of Sierra Leone in March 1991.85 New rebel groups formed in
opposition to Taylor's NPFL and the fighting continued. 6 After
Taylor launched a full-scale assault on Monrovia in October
1992, the United Nations began a period of limited involvement
beyond humanitarian aid. 7 In November 1992, the Security
Council called for a cease-fire and endorsed an embargo on
weapons transfers to Liberia,"8  and in September 1993
established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
(UNOMIL) to monitor and supervise compliance with the terms
of the cease-fire agreement agreed to by the warring factions in
August 1993.89 As noted by the Security Council, "this would be
the first peace-keeping mission undertaken by the United
Nations in cooperation with a peace-keeping mission already set
up by another organization, in this case ECOWAS."'  However,
with very limited strength9 and a limited mandate,92 UNOMIL
had almost no control over the enforcement of the cease-fire. As
a powerless observer force, UNOMIL's presence essentially
legitimized ECOMOG activities and only delayed the inevitable
victory by Taylor in the 1997 elections.93 After the elections, the
Security Council did not extend the UNOMIL mandate and
84. See STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 4, at 99-100; Wippman, supra note 82,
at 168-69; Funmi Olonisakin, Liberia, in DEALING WITH CONFLICT IN AFRICA: THE
UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 111, 116-17 (Jane Boulden ed.,
2003).
85. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, LIBERIA: THE KEY TO ENDING REGIONAL
INSTABILITY 2 (2002), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documentsl
report archive/A400627_24042002.pdf; MACQUEEN, supra note 36, at 174;
Wippman, supra note 82, at 170.
86. See Wippman, supra note 82, at 170-73.
87. MACQUEEN, supra note 36, at 174; Olonisakin, supra note 84, at 118;
Wippman, supra note 82, at 172-73.
88. S.C. Res. 788, U.N. Doc. S/RES/788 (Nov. 19, 1992).
89. S.C. Res. 866, U.N. Doc. S/RES/866 (Sept. 22, 1993).
90. Id.
91. UNOMIL had a maximum strength of about 300 military personnel in its
initial phase, dropping to 160 in November 1995 in the wake of increased fighting
and to single digits after the evacuation of most U.N. personnel in April 1996.
MACQUEEN, supra note 36, at 169, 178; Olonisakin, supra note 84, at 120.
92. "Without participation in enforcement activities, [UNOMIL is] to
coordinate with ECOMOG in the discharge of ECOMOG's separate responsibilities."
S.C. Res. 866, supra note 89, 3(h).
93. MACQUEEN, supra note 36, at 179.
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withdrew UNOMIL in September 1997, leaving behind a
minimal Peace-building Support Office (UNOL)' ECOMOG
withdrew from Liberia in November 1999. 9'
B. CURRENT INTERVENTION IN LIBERIA
Taylor's corrupt, intimidating, and abusive rule contributed
to the resumption of civil war in Liberia. From a loose coalition
of dissidents organized through ECOMOG in 1998, Liberian
exiles formed a rebel group in 2000, Liberians United for
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), with the aim of
overthrowing Taylor's government. 6 LURD began invading
Liberia from Guinea in July 2000, and Taylor responded by
sending government troops, Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
fighters, and Guinean dissidents on a counterattack into
Guinea. 7 This started a period of violent conflict between
Taylor's forces and LURD, with more than 100,000 people
already internally displaced by fighting in July 2002.98 In
March 2003, a faction of LURD in Cote d'Ivoire formed an
independent rebel group called the Movement for Democracy in
Liberia (MODEL), allied with LURD in advocating the
overthrow of Taylor, but wanting to prevent LURD from gaining
control of Monrovia.9  By May 2003, LURD and MODEL
controlled nearly two-thirds of the country,"° and in June and
July, LURD laid siege to Monrovia, with MODEL advancing on,
but never reaching, the capital.''
In late July 2003, ECOWAS leaders agreed to again
intervene in Liberia by deploying the ECOWAS Mission in
Liberia (ECOMIL) in early August. 2 At the same time, the
Security Council authorized 'Member States to establish a
94. S.C. Res. 1116, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1116 (June 27, 1997); The Secretary-
General, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Liberia, 3, U.N.
Doc. S/2003/875 (Sept. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Report on Liberia].
95. Report on Liberia, supra note 94, 3.
96. LIBERIA: THE KEY TO ENDING REGIONAL INSTABILITY, supra note 85, at 3-4.
97. Id. at 4.
98. LIBERIA: UNRAVELLING 1 (2002), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org
library/documents/report archive/A400741_19082002.pdf.
99. TACKLING LIBERIA: THE EYE OF THE REGIONAL STORM 20-21 (2003),
available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/reportarchive/A400960_
30042003.pdf.
100. Report on Liberia, supra note 94, 9.
101. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, LIBERIA: SECURITY CHALLENGES 5 (2003),
available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/071_liberia_
security-challenges.pdf.
102. Report on Liberia, supra note 94, 9.
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Multinational Force in Liberia" and declared "its readiness to
establish . . . a follow-on United Nations stabilization force to
support the transitional government and assist in the
implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement for
Liberia."'' 3 Under pressure from the rebels, ECOMIL, and the
U.N., Taylor gave up power and left for Nigeria on August 11,
2003."°4 The warring factions signed the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement on August 18, which established the National
Transitional Government (NTG), dividing the government
among Taylor's former government, LURD, and MODEL.' 5 In
September 2003, the Security Council established the United
Nations Mission in Liberia, requesting that the Secretary-
General transfer authority from ECOMIL to UNMIL, and
authorizing a force of up to 15,000 military personnel, 250
military observers, 160 staff, and 1,115 police officers.' 6 On
October 1, UNMIL took over peacekeeping responsibilities from
ECOMIL.'°7
Although the UNMIL intervention was the largest and most
robust U.N. mission in the world at the time and assisted by a
Chapter VII mandate,' insecurity continued in the years
following its deployment. Disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration (DDR) efforts did not initially proceed smoothly, 10 9
and comprehensive UNMIL deployment proceeded slowly."0
Though the DDR program overcame its early difficulties, the
security situation remained fragile, with continuing violent
incidents involving rebel groups, students, ex-combatants, and
ex-government employees."' After fair and very well-attended
103. S.C. Res. 1497, 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1497 (Aug. 1, 2003).
104. Report on Liberia, supra note 94, 13.
105. Id. 15; LIBERIA: SECURITY CHALLENGES supra note 101, at 3.
106. S.C. Res. 1509, supra note 80, 1.
107. The Secretary-General, First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on
the United Nations Mission in Liberia, 2, delivered to the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/2003/1175 (Dec. 15, 2003) [hereinafter First Progress Report].
108. LIBERIA: SECURITY CHALLENGES, supra note 101, at 1.
109. See The Secretary-General, Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General
on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, 19, delivered to the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/2004/229 (Mar. 22, 2004) [hereinafter Second Progress Report]. See also
STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 4, at 171.
110. First Progress Report, supra note 107, 7; see also Second Progress Report,
supra note 109, 4.
111. See, e.g., The Secretary-General, Fourteenth Progress Report of the
Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, 10, delivered to the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/151 (Mar. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Fourteenth
Progress Report]; The Secretary-General, Twelfth Progress Report of the Secretary.
General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, TT 15-17, delivered to the Security
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elections on October 11, 2005 and run-off elections on November
8,12 Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was sworn in as President on January
16, 2006."' While large problems remain in dealing with the
legacy of decades of war and the lack of state institutions, the
political and security situation has been relatively stable since
President Johnson Sirleafs election. President Johnson Sirleaf
has been committed to controlling corruption and increasing
security, with some success."4  The Security Council has
continued to extend the UNMIL mandate, and as of August 8,
2007, UNMIL troop strength remains at 14,141 out of an
authorized 15,125."' In September 2006, the Secretary-General
laid out benchmarks to be met for the consolidation, drawdown,
and withdrawal of UNMIL."6 As these benchmarks are met, the
Security Council will begin a "phased, gradual consolidation,
drawdown and withdrawal of UNMIL's troop contingent, as the
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/743 (Sept. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Twelfth Progress Report];
The Secretary-General, Eighth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Mission in Liberia, TT 15-17, delivered to the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/2005/560 (Sept. 1, 2005) [hereinafter Eighth Progress Report]; The Secretary-
General, Seventh Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Mission in Liberia, IT 19-23, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/391
(June 16, 2005) [hereinafter Seventh Progress Report]; The Secretary-General, Sixth
Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia,
99 15-18, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/177 (Mar. 17, 2005)
[hereinafter Sixth Progress Report]; The Secretary-General, Third Progress Report of
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, TT 8-12, delivered
to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/430 (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter Third
Progress Report].
112. The Secretary-General, Ninth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on
the United Nations Mission in Liberia, IT 2, 10, 13, delivered to the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/2005/764 (Dec. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Ninth Progress Report] (voter
turnout was 74.9% for the first elections and 61% for the run-off).
113. The Secretary-General, Tenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on
the United Nations Mission in Liberia, 4, delivered to the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/2006/159 (Mar. 14, 2006) [hereinafter Tenth Progress Report].
114. See The Secretary-General, Thirteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, 6-7, 10, delivered to the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/958 (Dec. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Thirteenth
Progress Report]; Fourteenth Progress Report, supra note 111, 99 7, 11. But see U.N.
Panel of Experts on Liberia, Report of the Panel of Experts Submitted Pursuant to
Paragraph 4(d) of Security Council Resolution 1731 (2006) Concerning Liberia, 17,
delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/340 (June 7, 2007) [hereinafter
Report of the Panel to Resolution 1731] (noting that civil servants continue to ask for
bribes and few have been penalized under the President's zero-tolerance corruption
policy).
115. See The Secretary-General, Fifteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, 64, delivered to the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/479 (Aug. 8, 2007) [hereinafter Fifteenth Progress Report].
116. Twelfth Progress Report, supra note 111, TT 71-72 & annex I.
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situation permits and without compromising the security of
Liberia." ' 7
IV. LIBERIA AND NATURAL RESOURCES GOVERNANCE
One of the specific mandates of UNMIL is "to assist the
transitional government in restoring proper administration of
natural resources .. . ."" In giving UNMIL this mandate, the
Security Council recognized the criticality of effective natural
resource governance in establishing a sustainable peace in
Liberia. The Secretary-General included management of
natural resources as a benchmark for the drawdown of
UNMIL."9 Using the concepts and framework from Part II, this
Part will describe Liberia's conflict risk from its natural
resources and analyze the successes and failures of the NTG,
UNMIL, and the new Liberian government in meeting the
natural resources mandate and establishing effective post-
conflict natural resources governance.
A. NATURAL RESOURCES IN LIBERIA
Liberia's primary natural resources are minerals, timber,
and rubber. Before the start of civil war in the late 1980s,
mining was the biggest sector of the economy, accounting for
two-thirds of Liberia's exports.'20  The mining sector was
primarily focused on iron ore and diamonds, followed by gold
and then other minerals mined in smaller quantities.
Historically, Liberia was one of the world's largest iron ore
exporters, with iron ore production and exports ranging from 12
million metric tons (Mt) per year to 24 Mt/yr during the period
from 1964 to 1989, the last year of any significant production. 121
All of the iron ore mines closed by 1991, with most of them
117. S.C. Res. 1750, $ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1750/62 (Mar. 30, 2007). In August
2007, the Secretary-General delivered recommendations to the Security Council for
the adjustment and drawdown of UNMIL. Fifteenth Progress Report, supra note
115, 68-76. This drawdown process is linked to a new set of benchmarks. Id. I
66-67.
118. S.C. Res. 1509, supra note 80, 1 3(r).
119. Twelfth Progress Report, supra note 111, at 20.
120. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ECON./COMMERCIAL SECTION, DOING BUSINESS IN
LIBERIA 20 (Aug. 2007), http://monrovia.usembassy.gov/uploads/images/
xGoSlozIaZz7M5PAN3V9pw/doingbusiness-in liberia_2007.pdf [hereinafter DOING
BUSINESS IN LIBERIA].
121. GEORGE J. COAKLEY, THE MINERAL INDUSTRY OF LIBERIA 24.1-24.2 (2004),
available at http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2004/limybO4.pdf.
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looted and damaged during the war or decaying due to neglect.'22
While there has been some recent reinvestment in the iron ore
industry,'23 this resource has not played a significant role in the
civil wars. However, as there are still extensive known
resources of iron ore left in Liberia,"4 iron ore could again
become a significant revenue source for the new government.
Diamond deposits occur primarily in two areas, the Ghanpa
area in Nimba county (north central Liberia) and a large area
on the western border between the Mano/Morro River and the
Loffa River (bordering Sierra Leone).'25 Between 1980 and 1988,
Liberian annual exports of rough diamonds ranged from 138,000
to 403,000 carats, averaging US$8.4 million annually.'26
However, with the outbreak of war in the 1990s, diamond
exports from Liberia increased dramatically.'27  Diamond
exports were far in excess of the quantity or quality available in
Liberia. For example, in 1999, official Liberian exports totaled
only 8,500 carats, but "Liberian" listed diamond imports to
Belgium totaled 1.75 million carats.2 ' This convinced the
Security Council that Liberia was engaging in the illicit trade of
diamonds from countries such as Sierra Leone, thereby funding
122. DOING BUSINESS IN LIBERIA, supra note 120, at 21.
123. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, UNDERSEC'Y FOR ECONOM., ENERGY AND AGRIC.
AFFAIRS, 2007 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT-LIBERIA (2007),
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/2007/80718.htm. Arcelor Mittal Steel recently
renegotiated its US$900+ million iron ore agreement with Liberia raising the
investment to over US$1 billion. See, e.g., Press Release, Arcelor Mittal, Arcelor
Mittal and the Government of Liberia Conclude Mining Review (Dec. 11, 2006),
http://www.arcelormittal.com/index.php?lang=en&page=49&tbPress=here&tbO=30;
Press Release, Global Witness, Mittal Steel did the Right Thing-Will Firestone?
(Apr. 30, 2007), http://www.globalwitness.org/media-library-detail.php/539/en/
mittalasteel did the-right -thing-will.firestone. Additionally, Mano River
Resources is conducting a pre-feasibility study of iron ore mining in the Putu Range.
Press Release, Mano River Resources Inc., Mano River Update on Putu Range Iron
Ore Project in Liberia (Mar. 12, 2007), http://www.manoriver.com/i/pdf/news/2007-
03-12_NR.pdf.
124. The Liberian Ministry of Land, Mines and Energy estimated that Liberia
had over 2.5 billion metric tons of iron ore reserves in 2004. See COAKLEY, supra
note 121, at 24.6 tbl. 3.
125. Id. at 24.3.
126. Id. at 24.5 tbl. 2; U.N. Envtl. Programme [UNEP], Desk Study on the
Environment in Liberia 57 (2004), available at http://postconflict.unep.chl
publicationsfLiberiaDS.pdf.
127. UNEP, supra note 126, at 57.
128. U.N. Panel of Experts on Liberia, Report of the Panel of Experts Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001), Paragraph 19, Concerning Liberia, 353,
delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1015 (Oct. 26, 2001) [hereinafter
Report of the Panel to Resolution 1343].
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RUF rebels. 129  Based on this finding, the Security Council
imposed sanctions on all diamond exports from Liberia in March
2001.130 After the imposition of sanctions, official Liberian
diamond exports ceased, but smuggling of alluvial diamonds
from small-scale artisanal operations into other countries
continued.'3' In April 2007, the Security Council decided to lift
the embargo on Liberian diamonds, 3 2 so Liberia will be entering
a new phase in its diamond exploitation.
Liberia has potential valuable gold reserves throughout the
country.'33 During the civil wars there was little formal gold
exploration activity in the country because of the lack of
security;" therefore any gold mining occurred primarily
through artisanal and small-scale operations.'35  With the
imposition of diamond sanctions, artisanal gold production
increased.'36  However, gold exports have not recently
constituted a large revenue source for Liberia.'37 The situation
is changing though. After the cessation of hostilities in 2003, a
number of mineral companies began exploration and study of
the potential for gold in Liberia, finding large reserves.'38
129. S.C. Res. 1343, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1343/56 (Mar. 7, 2001).
130. Id. 6.
131. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1343, supra note 128, 359-60.
132. S.C. Res. 1753, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1753/62 (Apr. 27, 2007).
133. See, e.g., Philip A. Szczesniak, The Mineral Industries of Cote d'Ivoire,
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, 3 MINERALS YEARBOOK 11.1, 11.3 (2000),
available at http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2000/ivgvlislmybOO.pdf;
UNEP, supra note 126, at 55 map 7.
134. See, e.g., Philip M. Mobbs, The Mineral Industry of Liberia, 3 MINERALS
YEARBOOK 26.1, 26.1 (1998), available at http:lminerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/
country/1998/li98.pdf; U.S. Geological Survey, The Mineral Industry of Other
Countries in Africa, 3 MINERALS YEARBOOK 623, 631 (1994), available at
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/19949247094.pdf; Thomas R. Yager,
The Mineral Industries of Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, 3
MINERALS YEARBOOK 11.1, 11.4 (2003), available at http://minerals.usgs.gov/
minerals/pubs/country/2003/ivgvlislmybO3.pdf.
135. UNEP, supra note 126, at 56.
136. U.N. Panel of Experts on Liberia, Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1395 (2002), Paragraph 4, in Relation to
Liberia, 109, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2002/470 (Apr. 19,
2002) [hereinafter Report of the Panel to Resolution 1395].
137. Figures for the export of alluvial gold in January 2002 showed only 192.90
ounces exported (US$41,642.19). Id. Reported annual production of gold from 2001
to 2005 fluctuated between 16 kilograms (564 ounces) and 110 kilograms (3880
ounces). Omayra Bermudez-Lugo, The Mineral Industry of Liberia, 3 MINERALS
YEARBOOK 24.1, 24.1 tbl. 1 (2005), available at http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/
pubs/country/2005[limybO5.pdf.
138. See, e.g., COAKLEY, supra note 121, at 24.2; Press Release, Mano River
Resources Inc., Positive Feasibility Study for New Liberty Gold Project (Jan. 10,
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Therefore, while gold exploitation was not as significant as
timber or diamonds during the civil war and will not be
discussed in detail throughout this article, revenues from the
future export of gold may assist in rebuilding Liberia's economy.
The agricultural sector makes up the other major natural
resource exports. Rubber production and logging are the major
agricultural exports for Liberia. A favorable climate, good soils,
and the absence of many predatory fungi give Liberia a
competitive advantage for rubber production.'39  Rubber
production began with Firestone establishing its first rubber
plantation in 1906 and then the world's largest industrial
rubber plantation at Harbel in 1926.'" Rubber exports grew
from US$19.4 million in 1997 to US$57.4 million in 2002. '
Because of the structure of the plantations and need for long-
term planning and investment, rubber is relatively well
controlled by foreign investors.'42 The gestation period of rubber
trees is five to six years, and, because no significant planting
has occurred, some reports indicate that the rubber industry is
on the verge of collapse.'43 Despite the potential state of the
industry in the future, rubber remains Liberia's primary
natural resource export, even after the 2003 intervention.'"
Liberia is the last area in West Africa with substantial
forest cover; about forty percent of Liberia's land area, or 4.6
million hectares, is forested,'45 representing approximately forty
percent of West Africa's remaining rain forest." The two
2007), http://manoriver.com/i/pdf/2007-01-10_- NR.pdf; Mano's Strategy Bearing Fruit,
WORLD MINING STOCKS, Nov. 2006, at 60, 60-61, available at http://www.mining-
journal.com/company-profiles/pdf/ManoRiverResources.pdf; Mano River on the Move:
Liberian Gold Mine Takes Shape, MINING REV. AFR., Nov.-Dec. 2006, at 46, 46-47,
available at http://www.miningreview.comarchive/mra_6_2006/pdf/46-47.pdf.
139. DOING BUSINESS IN LIBERIA, supra note 120, at 22.
140. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1395, supra note 136, 142; UNEP, supra
note 126, at 33.
141. UNEP, supra note 126, at 33.
142. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1343, supra note 128, 320.
143. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1395, supra note 136, 142; UNEP, supra
note 126, at 33; DOING BUSINESS IN LIBERIA, supra note 120, at 22.
144. Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Liberia
(Dec. 2007), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6618.htm. In 2005, rubber exports
equaled US$99 million of a total export trade of US$112 million. Id. Much of
Liberia's remaining revenues at this point come from its maritime flag registry
program, the second largest in the world. Id.
145. Report of the Panel of Experts Pursuant to Paragraph 25 of Security Council
Resolution 1478 (2003) Concerning Liberia, 31, delivered to the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/2003/779 (Aug. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Report of the Panel to Resolution
1478].
146. Background Note: Liberia, supra note 144.
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remaining densely-forested areas are in the northwest and the
southeast.'47 Since President Doe seized power in 1980, the
timber industry has gone through five major periods. From
1980 until the NPFL uprising in 1990, the industry increased
production dramatically, producing almost three million cubic
meters of timber in 1989. '48 During the 1990s, the industry
stagnated because of the civil war; however, after Taylor gained
power in 1997, production again increased. '49  Round log
production totaled about 680,000 cubic meters (valued at
US$46.2 million) in the first six months of 2001.150 The
increasing violence from civil war and U.N. sanctions on the
Liberian timber industry in May 2003'"' led to a sharp decline in
production, with large-scale logging and official exports
ceasing. 152 Only small-scale domestic pitsawing operations
continued (using chainsaws to cut and process logs into
planks).'53 The most recent phase of Liberia's timber industry
started in June 2006 with the lifting of timber sanctions. '54
Liberia then adopted the comprehensive National Forestry
Reform Law in October 2006.'5  While there are no legal timber
contracts presently in place, '56 Liberia's Forestry Development
Authority (FDA) plans to award six short-term timber sales
contracts in 2008.157
B. CONFLICT AND NATURAL RESOURCE CONTROL IN LIBERIA
1997-2003
Liberia's dependence on natural resources places it at
147. UNEP, supra note 126, at 44.
148. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1478, supra note 145, T 31.
149. Id.
150. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1343, supra note 128, 31.
151. S.C. Res. 1478, 17, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1478 (May 6, 2003).
152. Report of the Panel of Experts Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 9(e) of
Security Council Resolution 1647 (2005) Concerning Liberia, 18, delivered to the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/379 (June 7, 2006) [hereinafter Report of the
Panel to Resolution 1647].
153. Id. 24.
154. See S.C. Res. 1689, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1689 (June 20, 2006).
155. S.C. Res. 1760, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1760 (June 20, 2007); Report of the Panel
of Experts Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 1(e) of Security Council Resolution
1760 (2007) Concerning Liberia, 71, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2007/689 (Dec. 5, 2007) [hereinafter Report of the Panel to Resolution 1760].
156. President Johnson Sirleaf nullified all timber concession claims because of
legal violations and tax evasion. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1731, supra note
114, 29. As of November 2007, there were still no legal logging operations in
Liberia. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1760, supra note 155, 77.
157. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1760, supra note 155, 1 78.
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continual risk of conflict. The success of Charles Taylor's rise to
power in the 1990s relied greatly upon revenues from natural
resources, especially alluvial diamonds and timber.'58 It is not
surprising then that Taylor would try to exert complete control
over Liberia's natural resources after his election. Taylor's
methods of natural resource governance provided him with
extravagant resource revenues, but at the expense of most of
Liberia.'5 9 Any successes Taylor achieved in resource capture
only led to further instability and the ultimate failure of his
rule. This Section discusses government and rebel control over
natural resources in the period from Taylor's taking power in
the late 1990s to his removal. Knowledge of this background is
necessary to understanding what might trigger conflict in the
future and how natural resources governance should proceed.
Taylor's government and rebel groups fought over Liberia's
rubber resources, with rebels eventually gaining control over the
rubber plantations. Rubber has more of the characteristics of a
proximate-point resource than diamonds and timber. Firestone
Natural Rubber Company owns and operates the primary
rubber plantation in Liberia in Harbel.' 6  The Firestone
plantation and its associated processing plant are only sixty
kilometers from Monrovia. 6 ' Some of the other rubber
production occurs in counties adjacent to Monrovia'62 and some
in counties further away.'63 The structure and investments
needed for viable rubber plantations make the resource more
158. See, e.g., LIBERIA: THE KEY TO ENDING REGIONAL INSTABILITY, supra note
85, at 2; MACQUEEN, supra note 36, at 174; O'Connell, supra note 49, at 214-16.
159. See, e.g., STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 4, at 100.
160. See, e.g., UNEP, supra note 126, at 33; DOING BUSINESS IN LIBERIA, supra
note 120, at 23. The Firestone plantation at Harbel dates back to 1926 when Harvey
S. Firestone obtained a one million acre concession from Liberia for 99 years with
exclusive rights to the land. U.N. MISSION IN LIBERIA [UNMIL], HUMAN RIGHTS IN
LIBERIA'S RUBBER PLANTATIONS: TAPPING INTO THE FUTURE 72 (2006), available at
http://unmil.org/documentslhr/liberiarubber.pdf. Firestone's Harbel rubber estate
has grown to be the largest single natural rubber estate in the world, covering
almost 200 square miles and including about 8 million rubber trees. Firestone
Natural Rubber Company LLC, History, http://www.firestonenaturalrubber.com
company-history.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2007).
161. UNMIL, supra note 160, at 72.
162. The Liberian Agriculture Company and Weala Rubber Corporation owned
plantations in Grand Bassa and Bong Counties, and the Guthrie Rubber Plantation
is located along the main road from Monrovia in Bomi and Grand Cape Mount
Counties. See, e.g., UNMIL, supra note 160, at 20-21; DOING BUSINESS IN LIBERIA,
supra note 120, at 23.
163. The Pleebo Rubber Company manages the government-owned Cavala
plantation in Maryland County, and the Sinoe Rubber Plantation in Sinoe County
has been through numerous managers. UNMIL, supra note 160, at 20-21.
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like oil or kimberlite diamonds in its susceptibility to
government control," and President Taylor had authority over
the awarding of new rubber concessions;'65 however, rebel
groups still took control of some plantation operations. During
the civil conflict, LURD rebels gained control of the Guthrie and
Sinoe rubber plantations and MODEL rebels achieved control of
the Cavalla rubber plantation, depriving the Taylor government
of any revenue streams from those plantations."
Taylor's diamond revenues during the late 1990s came both
from mining operations in Liberia and smuggling operations
with Sierra Leone. The latter made up the bulk of Liberia's
diamond trade, with the 8,500 carats of official Liberian exports
in 1999 reported to be only ten to twenty percent of what was
actually leaving the country.'67 This was a pattern. In 1998,
Liberia reported 8,000 carats of exports for a value of
US$800,000, but Belgium recorded imports from Liberia by
twenty-six companies totaling 2.56 million carats. 6 ' Numerous
international diamond dealers had established offices in Liberia
and, with the government, helped create fictitious mines and
companies as a cover for the smuggling.69 Taylor was reported
to have a representative overseeing diamond operations in
Sierra Leone, and other high-level Liberian officials were
otherwise involved in the illicit diamond smuggling from Sierra
Leone. 170
In response to the reports of Liberian involvement in the
illicit trade of Sierra Leone diamonds and Liberia's support of
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels in Sierra Leone,
the Security Council directed in March 2001 "that all States
shall take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or
indirect import of all rough diamonds from Liberia, whether or
not such diamonds originated in Liberia. '.7 ' President Taylor
164. See, e.g., Report of Panel to Resolution 1395, supra note 136, 1 142; Report
of Panel to Resolution 1343, supra note 128, 320; DOING BUSINESS IN LIBERIA,
supra note 120, at 21-22.
165. Report of Panel to Resolution 1395, supra note 136, 1 143.
166. See UNMIL, supra note 160, at 20-21.
167. Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1306 (2000), Paragraph 19, in Relation to Sierra Leone, 88, delivered to
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1195 (Dec. 20, 2000) [hereinafter Report of
the Panel to Resolution 1306].
168. Id. 122.
169. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1306, supra note 167, TT 126-29; UNEP,
supra note 126, at 58.
170. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1306, supra note 167, $T 86-89.
171. S.C. Res. 1343, supra note 129, 6.
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acknowledged the diamond ban;"' however, significant evidence
pointed to his continued involvement in diamond production and
smuggling even after the embargo was in place."' U.N. experts
connected the illicit diamond industry to the import of arms for
Liberian government forces in violation of U.N. sanctions.'74
Several reports found evidence that President Taylor harbored
senior al Qaeda operatives in the months following September
2001 in return for a US$1 million payment.'75 The terrorist
operatives had been engaging in a US$20 million "diamond-
buying spree" in the region since 1998.176
While sanctions on diamond exports had a significant effect
on diamond production, continued violent conflict suppressed
diamond production even further. 7  Taylor's Liberian
government and rebels continually fought for control of the
diamond-producing regions. Rebels succeeded in taking control
of many alluvial diamond areas and began smuggling Liberian
rough diamonds into neighboring countries.' Desiring an
independent source of revenue for its war effort, LURD tried to
establish regular diamond trafficking, especially through
Guinea.'7 9 At the same time, the government made it a prime
objective to prevent LURD from gaining sustained access to
diamond production.8 ° While the government made efforts to
stop the illicit diamond trade and to establish a certification
scheme for rough diamonds, 8 ' the smuggling continued, albeit
at a declined intensity. 2 Diamond production in the months
172. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1343, supra note 128, 355.
173. Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1408 (2002), Paragraph 16, Concerning Liberia, 131-32, delivered to
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1115 (Oct. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Report of the
Panel to Resolution 1408]; Report of the Panel to Resolution 1395, supra note 136,
115-18; Report of the Panel to Resolution 1343, supra note 128, 360, 365.
174. See S.C. Res. 1343, supra note 129, 5(a); Report of the Panel to Resolution
1408, supra note 173, 134-37.
175. Douglas Farah, Report Says Africans Harbored al Qaeda: Terror Assets
Hidden in Gem-Buying Spree, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2002, at Al.
176. Id.
177. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1408, supra note 173, 138.
178. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1343, supra note 128, 363; Report of the
Panel to Resolution 1395, supra note 136, 110.
179. Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of
Security Council Resolution 1458 (2003), Concerning Liberia, 125, delivered to the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/498 (Apr. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Report of the
Panel to Resolution 1458].
180. Id. 126.
181. Id. 133-37; Report of the Panel to Resolution 1408, supra note 173,
152; Report of the Panel to Resolution 1395, supra note 136, 104-05, 130-39.
182. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1458, supra note 179, 130.
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before Taylor left office in August 2003 occurred primarily in
Lofa and Nimba Counties, with the illegal exports going
principally through the capitals of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and
Cote d'Ivoire'
The timber trade during Taylor's regime was marked by
corrupt government control. Timber supported Taylor's rise to
power in the 1990s by supplying an independent source of
revenue to the NPFL.' When Taylor took the presidency, he
quickly appointed his brother to head the Forestry Development
Authority and issued a government order giving the FDA
authority to collect a large amount of taxes applied to logging,
effectively giving Taylor complete control over timber
revenues.8 5  Liberia's government passed a new National
Forestry Law in January 2000 declaring that almost all forest
resources are the property of the Government and giving the
FDA power to unilaterally grant and deny logging concessions. 6
Taylor used his power to consolidate logging concessions
into large operations that he could exercise control over more
easily. In 2000, Taylor granted only twenty-five logging
concessions, and 10 of these accounted for more than eighty-five
percent of the semi-annual production. 7 Many of the timber
companies' granted concessions had close connections to
President Taylor, an apparently necessary ingredient to
profitable operations. 8 Three of the largest timber companies
were owned at least in part by Gus Kouwenhoven, a Dutch
national and close friend of Charles Taylor who helped Taylor
with timber revenues during Taylor's rise to power. 9 The
largest of these companies, the Oriental Timber Company, was
created in 1999 and controlled over forty percent of Liberia's
183. Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Paragraph 25 of
Security Council Resolution 1478 (2003), Concerning Liberia, 126-34, delivered to
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/937 (Oct. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Report of the
Panel to Resolution 1478 Paragraph 25].
184. See, e.g., Report of the Panel to Resolution 1343, supra note 128, T 322;
Rudy S. Salo, When the Logs Roll Over: The Need for an International Convention
Criminalizing Involvement in the Global Illegal Timber Trade, 16 GEO. INT'L ENVTL.
L. REV. 127, 133 (2003).
185. See, e.g., Report of the Panel to Resolution 1343, supra note 128, T 329;
GLOBAL WITNESS, LOGS OF WAR supra note 49, at 23-24.
186. LOGS OF WAR, supra note 49, at 26; Report of the Panel to Resolution 1343,
supra note 128, 329-30.
187. LOGS OF WAR, supra note 49, at 24.
188. See Report of the Panel to Resolution 1343, supra note 128, 9 333-42.
189. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1478, supra note 145, tbl.1; Report of the
Panel to Resolution 1343, supra note 128, $ 333; Salo, supra note 184, at 133.
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productive forests, accounting for almost fifty percent of total
timber production.9 °
Timber operations in Liberia during Taylor's regime were
linked to corruption, the arms trade, and human rights abuses.
Large amounts of timber tax revenues were unaccounted for
during Taylor's presidency and the FDA remained outside the
central revenue account for Liberia, thus making an accurate
determination of tax revenues and expenditures impossible. 9 '
Much of the money paid by timber companies went directly to
Taylor, government officials, and local militias for security.
92
Timber companies were directly involved in providing military
supplies and arms to Taylor's government in direct violation of
U.N. sanctions.9 Additionally, the timber companies and their
militias committed numerous human rights abuses, including
intimidation, imprisonment, torture, forced displacement, and
murder, often assisted by the government. 9 4
As the civil conflict intensified in 2002, rebel activities
began disrupting timber production.' 95 By April 2003, hostilities
and sanctions had effectively shut down official Liberian timber
operations.' 96  While rebels took control of some timber
concessions during the conflict, it does not appear that the
rebels began efforts to obtain revenue from these concessions
until after Taylor left office and the peace agreement was signed
in August 2003.'9
190. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1395, supra note 136, 148; Report of the
Panel to Resolution 1343, supra note 128, 333; Report of the Panel to Resolution
1478, supra note 145, 7 31.
191. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1478, supra note 145, T 38-40; Report of
the Panel to Resolution 1408, supra note 173, T 192.
192. LOGS OF WAR, supra note 49, at 24-25; Report of the Panel to Resolution
1478, supra note 145, 7 39; Report of the Panel of Experts Pursuant to Paragraph 22
of Security Council Resolution 1521 (2003), Concerning Liberia, 115-16, delivered
to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/20041396 (June 1, 2004) [hereinafter Report of
the Panel to Resolution 1521].
193. S.C. Res. 1343, supra note 129, 7 5(a); LOGS OF WAR, supra note 49, at 24-
25; Report of the Panel to Resolution 1343, supra note 128, 7 346-49. In 2006, a
Dutch court convicted Gus Kouwenhoven of trafficking arms to Liberia in violation
of sanctions. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1731, supra note 114, 38; see also
infra note 200.
194. See, e.g., LOGS OF WAR, supra note 49, at 25-28; Report of the Panel to
Resolution 1521, supra note 192, 115 & box 3; Report of the Panel to Resolution
1478, supra note 145, 7 59.
195. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1408, supra note 173, 7 189; Report of the
Panel to Resolution 1395, supra note 136, 145.
196. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1478, supra note 145, 7 34; Report of the
Panel to Resolution 1458, supra note 179, 149.
197. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1478 Paragraph 25, supra note 183, T 152;
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By the end of the civil conflict, rebels had succeeded in
gaining control of many rubber, diamond, and timber areas.
Taylor had exploited natural resources for the exclusive benefit
of his regime, at the expense of Liberia's development and its
people. As discussed in Part II, these factors provided both
greed and grievance motivations and created a recipe for
instability even after the signing of peace agreements. For any
post-conflict multinational intervention to be successful in
Liberia or any country in a similar situation, the intervening
forces must address the central government's legacy of natural
resource mismanagement and ex-combatants' control of those
resources.
C. EFFECTIVE NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE
Pekka Haavisto, the current European Union Special
Representative for Darfur and former chairman of numerous
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) post-
conflict environmental assessments (including Liberia), had this
to say about natural resources and conflict in Liberia:
[S]ome people might feel it is not a priority to put up environmental
administration in a post-conflict situation. This is actually what we
have faced in Liberia, people say to us, "You know, again the
environmental people can wait a little bit, let's deal with other issues."
But if you don't establish this kind of proper control of the natural
resources ... it's a wild situation. Whoever can control it does, and it's
usually then controlled by illegal activities, criminal groups, or
different kinds of armed groups .... And actually, in some countries,
it's not only by criminal groups but also a lot of corruption with this
illegal trade of natural resources over the borders. So if you want to
stop these activities and also the corrupted activities, you have to have
a legal framework in place.
198
The necessary legal framework for resolving natural
resource issues in the post-conflict period, and therefore
lessening the chance of conflict, is divided into three general
areas in this article: pre-intervention, security and control, and
internal governance. This Section will examine how these
specific measures were employed in Liberia and discuss their
effectiveness. While this article focuses only on the above three
areas, there are many more relevant considerations for effective
Report of the Panel to Resolution 1478, supra note 145, 35.
198. Pekka Haavisto, Keynote Address at the Georgetown International
Environmental Law Review Symposium: International Responses to the
Environmental Impacts of War (Feb. 2, 2005), in 17 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 565,
588 (2005).
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natural resource governance after intervention, such as
economics,'99 business practices, 200 continuing sanction regimes,
legislative reforms, property considerations, and controlling
corruption. Future scholarship should expand the scope of this
research to include these considerations and provide
organizations involved in stability operations with a more
comprehensive analysis.
1. Pre-Intervention Phase
All three of the general areas discussed in this Section must
be considered in depth before any intervention as part of an
overall blueprint for building the rule of law in a post-conflict
state. °' Too often, interveners will approach the situation with
199. Internal economic reforms (such as diversification of the economy into
manufacturing), international economic aid and debt forgiveness (enabling the
country to rebuild its resource infrastructure and begin obtaining revenues for
further progress), international economic reforms (such as changing tariff structures
to allow for profitable export of manufactured resources) and other economic
measures are all critical to effective post-conflict management of natural resources,
but these are outside the scope of this article. For a good summary of these
measures, see LE BILLON, supra note 6, at 51-79.
200. Encouraging ethical investment and business practices is also a critical
step in ensuring responsible and sustainable extraction by multinational resource
extraction corporations, but one that both the new state government, and the entire
international community must take on. Corporate codes of conduct, state laws (such
as the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) and international conventions (such as
the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions) can all serve to influence corporate conduct.
See BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 139-42 (5th ed. 2003). For an
excellent description of corrupt business practices in the timber trade, see Goodman
& Finn, supra note 49, Apr. 1, 2007, at Al. Regarding Liberia, the practices of
multinational resource extraction corporations have been under considerable
scrutiny since the end of the latest fighting. See, e.g., Press Release, Global Witness,
Mittal Steel, supra note 123; GLOBAL WITNESS, HEAVY MITTAL? A STATE WITHIN A
STATE: THE INEQUITABLE MINERAL DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA AND MITTAL STEEL HOLDINGS NV (2006), available at
http://www.globalwitness.org/media -library-detail.php/156/en/heavy-mittal. The
former owner of the Oriental Timber Company and other logging companies
conducting operations in Liberia, Gus Kouwenhoven, was sentenced to eight years in
prison by a Dutch court for breaking the U.N. arms embargo and smuggling
weapons for Taylor but was acquitted on charges of war crimes and crimes against
humanity. Marlise Simons, 8-Year Sentence for Businessman who Smuggled Arms
to Liberia, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2006, at AS.
201. See STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 4, at 85.
Blueprints lay out the critical steps interveners and their local partners
expect to take to move a state from the shock of military intervention to
self-government under the rule of law. Typically, they include provisions
for maintaining security, forming an interim government, conducting
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a short-term focus driven by political and military
considerations back home, and the resulting blueprints will fail
to fully consider local history, culture, and norms, as well as fail
to adopt a long-term approach to stabilization.2 "2 Part of any
effective individualized and long-term blueprint must include
natural resources. By their very nature, natural resource issues
require examination at the local, regional, and national level
and necessitate a short and long-term approach. While
blueprints must be general and flexible enough to evolve to
changing situations within the country,"3 failure to consider an
important area of the intervention before it starts will inevitably
result in that area receiving support that is too little or too late
in the post-intervention phase. As Pekka Haavisto stated
above, this is often seen in the area of natural resources,
particularly in Liberia.
While the UNMIL and the National Transitional
Government of Liberia (NTG) may not have experienced
complete success in their management of Liberia's natural
resources, there is evidence that natural resource issues entered
into the U.N.'s pre-intervention planning. The impact of
natural resources on conflict in West Africa entered into reports
and resolutions before UNMIL intervention in September 2003.
The Security Council imposed sanctions on Liberia's diamond
exports in March 20012" and timber exports in May 2003.205 By
direction of the Security Council, the Secretary-General
regularly (on a biannual basis) commissioned a panel of experts
to study the sources of conflict and effectiveness of sanctions
regarding Liberia starting in December 2000.2o6 Finally, in
establishing UNMIL, the Security Council mandated UNMIL
"to assist the transitional government in restoring proper
administration of natural resources."2 7 This last point should
elections to choose a new government, and in many cases, drafting the
constitution under which that government will operate.
202. See id. at 88-90.
203. See id. at 91.
204. S.C. Res. 1343, supra note 129, 9 6.
205. S.C. Res. 1478, supra note 151, 17(a).
206. See, e.g., Report of the Panel to Resolution 1306, supra note 167, 99 122-30,
141-43, 157 (discussing the role of Liberia in the conflict diamond trade influencing
conflict in Sierra Leone and recommending an embargo on Liberian diamond
exports); Report of the Panel to Resolution 1343, supra note 128 (providing the first
in a series of biannual reports including discussion on the effectiveness of sanctions
on natural resource exports and the influence of natural resources on Liberia's
stability).
207. S.C. Res. 1509, supra note 80, 3(r).
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not be understated. Explicit inclusion of natural resources in a
U.N. mission's mandate is a significant and critically necessary
step. Previous and subsequent Security Council resolutions
establishing U.N. missions in countries with considerable
natural resource issues did not include any mention of natural
resources.2 11 Without an explicit mandate regarding natural
resources, this issue becomes secondary to others and is not
required to be considered in subsequent reports of the
Secretary-General and panels of experts. Having not prioritized
natural resources to at least the same level as other
considerations, the U.N. mission will then be confronting
natural resource issues in an ad hoc and inconsistent manner,
thus creating further potential for instability.
Before intervention, the international organization or
intervening states must also conduct adequate studies of the
characteristics and control of natural resources in the country.2°
These studies must also include an overview of the government
institutions (or lack thereof) established for managing those
resources. As discussed in Part II, resource characteristics are
very significant in determining the susceptibility of the
resources to rebel or government control. Determining who is in
effective control of these resources is critical to setting up
security and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
208. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1704, 1 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1704 (Aug. 25, 2006)
(establishing the U.N. Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste); S.C. Res. 1590, 4, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1590 (Mar. 24, 2005) (establishing the U.N. Mission in Sudan); S.C. Res.
1542, 7 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1542 (Apr. 30, 2004) (establishing the U.N. Stabilization
Mission in Haiti); S.C. Res. 1528, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1528 (Feb. 27, 2004)
(establishing the U.N. Operation in Cote d'Ivoire); S.C. Res. 1410, 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1410 (May 17, 2002) (establishing the U.N. Mission in Support of East
Timor); S.C. Res. 1401, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1401 (Mar. 28, 2002) (establishing the
U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and referencing for its mandate a report of
the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on
the Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and
Security, 7 94-97, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N.
Doc. S/2002/278, A/56/875 (Mar. 18, 2002)); S.C. Res. 1291, 7, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1291 (Feb. 24, 2000) (establishing the U.N. Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo); S.C. Res. 1320, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1320 (Sept.
15, 2000) (establishing the U.N. Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea); S.C. Res. 1270, T
8, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1270 (Oct. 22, 1999) (establishing the U.N. Mission in Sierra
Leone); S.C. Res. 866, supra note 89, 7 3 (establishing the U.N. Observer Mission in
Liberia).
209. Cf. STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 4, at 130 ("[N]o plans for reform can
succeed without a realistic, strategic assessment of existing local resources for the
rule of law. Such an assessment will help to identify what resources--cultural,
human, material, and, indeed, legal-are available and also how to best make use of
them." (first emphasis in original, second emphasis added)).
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(DDR) operations and assisting the transitional government in
establishing effective institutions once the intervention begins.
The record for pre-intervention studies on natural resources
in Liberia is mixed. After sanctions were imposed on diamonds
and timber, the U.N. mandated panel of experts addressed these
resources and the effects of the sanctions in their reports prior
to the establishment of UNMIL; however, with the exception of
one report on the timber industry,"' none of these reports
described in any depth the characteristics and control of natural
resources."' The U.N. did eventually conduct a comprehensive
and detailed study of the environment and natural resources
that included recommendations for effective environmental
governance, but this was not published even in draft form until
February 2004, five months after UNMIL had begun its
operations.2
Providing some kind of pre-intervention study of natural
resources is critical. In many cases, the security situation in a
country may not allow a detailed pre-intervention study or the
U.N. may decide to intervene very quickly after the rise of
hostilities, therefore not allowing time for a detailed study;
however, a great deal of information can be gained without even
entering a country or by confining operations to safe areas."3 In
Liberia's case, the U.N. had extensive prior experience with
resource operations through the earlier UNOMIL mission and
several events indicated that an intervention in Liberia was
forthcoming. 14 However, because the U.N. did not utilize these
advantages by beginning natural resource studies on Liberia
earlier than it in fact did, it lost the power to provide decision
makers with detailed natural resource information before the
UNMIL intervention.
210. See Report of the Panel to Resolution 1478, supra note 145 (providing some
background of the timber resources in Liberia in assessing the impact of recently
imposed timber sanctions).
211. See, e.g., Report of the Panel to Resolution 1458, supra note 179, 11 125-47;
Report of the Panel to Resolution 1408, supra note 173, 1 124-56, 189-94; Report of
the Panel to Resolution 1395, supra note 136, 1 102-37, 144-50; Report of the Panel
to Resolution 1343, supra note 128, 77 320-86.
212. See UNEP, supra note 126, at 42-83.
213. Much of the information in the pre-intervention reports of the Panel of
Experts concerning Liberia was obtained without the Panel ever leaving Monrovia
because of the security situation. See Report of the Panel to Resolution 1458, supra
note 179, I 23--29 (describing the Panel's methodology).
214. The international community had been considering a response to instability
in Liberia over a year before intervention. See Report on Liberia, supra note 94, IT
6-8.
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Pre-intervention sanctions on extractive industries can be
effective in targeting belligerents without a large humanitarian
impact by reducing access to revenue resources that may be
prolonging conflict."5 However, depriving rebels or governments
of resource revenues will not always shorten conflict. When one
side of a conflict has greater access to revenues, this may alter




The weaker opponent(s) may then have greater incentives to
settle the conflict, or the imbalance will result in quicker victory
for the strong side. When sanctions work to bring the more
powerful side into balance with the weaker side, conflict
duration may increase. Therefore, any pre-intervention
sanctions on natural resource exports must work to weaken all
combatants and allow for external forces to establish control;
alternatively, the sanctions must so severely widen the disparity
of power so as to give the weakened side a strong incentive to
negotiate a peaceful settlement.
In Liberia's case, the sanctions on diamonds and timber
worked to deprive Taylor of revenues essential for his continued
control over all of Liberia. As seen in Section B above, the
diamond embargo imposed in 2001 pushed Taylor to other
sources of legal revenue (e.g., increased taxes on timber and
other indirect taxes), and to illegal smuggling operations,
showing the importance of diamond revenues to Taylor's
regime. 21' The loss of revenue from the diamond sector also
resulted in under-regulation of the mining sector, therefore
weakening central government control of mining operations and
allowing for increased rebel control.1 8 Once timber sanctions
were imposed in May 2003, Taylor's government was deprived of
another large source of revenue, therefore further weakening his
control.29 Taylor would depart office only three months later.
While both Taylor's government and rebel groups were able to
obtain continued illicit resource revenues despite the sanctions,
it appears that Taylor's government was weakened enough to
allow LURD and MODEL to advance to the capital and force the
international community to respond and Taylor to flee the state.
215. See LE BILLON, supra note 6, at 63.
216. Humphreys, supra note 22, at 514-15.
217. See, e.g., Report of the Panel to Resolution 1458, supra note 179, 150;
Report of the Panel to Resolution 1343, supra note 128, 45.
218. See Report of the Panel to Resolution 1408, supra note 173, 142.
219. See, e.g., Report of the Panel to Resolution 1521, supra note 192, 1 7; Report
of the Panel to Resolution 1478, supra note 145, 8.
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
Whether the sanctions succeeded is a question of timing and
goals. The weakening of the government may have further
prolonged the conflict, 2 ' but it did result in Taylor's resignation.
Regardless of the effectiveness of sanctions in depriving
belligerents of conflict revenues, the sanctions must not
independently worsen the humanitarian situation in the
country. If the sanctions themselves are seen as the reason for
worsening social services and human rights violations, the
populace may respond negatively to any international
intervention and the affected government may exploit these
grievances to retain control, despite worsening conditions.
Sanctions may also "aggravate conflicts by criminalizing
targeted belligerents, making it more likely that they will be
less inclined to negotiate politically. 22' Conversely, if the
central government is seen as the cause of poor humanitarian
conditions, sanctions may have no effect on the populace's
perception or the sanctions may serve to further stigmatize the
government, therefore making foreign intervention more
acceptable.2 Liberia seems to fit in this second category. While
the sanctions potentially resulted in a large loss of income and
employment to rural communities, Taylor's government had
long ago abrogated its responsibility to provide basic social
services, and many of the government-supervised resource
operations were committing human rights abuses.223 Therefore,
it appears that pre-intervention sanctions did little to change
the overall poor humanitarian situation in Liberia, and a poll
taken after the conflict indicated that many Liberians
understood the rationale for the sanctions.224
2. Establishing Security and Control
Reestablishing a secure environment after a military
intervention is a required building block and often the hardest
part of stability operations; without basic security throughout
the country, any further progress is destined to fail.225 In the
context of natural resources, establishing security involves three
main areas. First, the multinational forces must have a
220. See Le Billon, supra note 60, at 236.
221. Id. at 235.
222. See id.
223. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1478, supra note 145, 5-12.
224. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1521, supra note 192, 7.
225. See STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 4, at 134.
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mandate and authority that permits some control of natural
resource areas. Second, the multinational forces must exercise
this authority to secure those areas capable of providing
resource revenues to belligerents and cede control of these areas
to the transitional government. Third, the transitional
government and multinational forces must establish an effective
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program, thus
reducing incentives for ex-combatants to try to regain control
over resource areas.
The importance of an effective mandate is discussed further
in the previous subsection; however, this area is closely linked
to the second area of actual control. Without a mandate and
authority explicitly addressing natural resources, any stability
force is likely only to respond to those areas where violent
conflict is ongoing or imminent. As a result, ex-combatants and
possible future spoilers can retain control over resource areas
often distant from the capital and gain revenues for supplies
and arms, increasing the possibility of a future conflict. The ex-
combatant exploitation of the resources, while illegal, may be
mostly peaceful, " ' therefore raising no immediate need for
response from the stability force. With an effective mandate
giving priority to and authority over natural resources areas,
stability forces could stop potential spoilers early before they
gain enough power to respond with force.
In addition to having sufficient authority, actually
establishing control over resource exploitation areas requires
sufficient strength. The majority of the resource areas
controlled by ex-combatants will be in locations distant from the
capital and/or the center of multinational operations. Therefore,
an effective post-conflict security response requires enough
forces to reach all the major resource operations and reestablish
government control over those operations. Even with a strong
mandate, a stability force with insufficient numbers will not be
226. See, e.g., Report of the Panel of Experts Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph
8(e) of Security Council Resolution 1579 (2004), Concerning Liberia, 107-14,
delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/360 (June 13, 2005) [hereinafter
Report of the Panel to Resolution 1579] (noting increased illegal diamond mining
operations in areas without NTG or UNMIL security forces); Report of the Panel of
Experts Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 1549 (2004),
Concerning Liberia, T 29, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/995
(Dec. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Report of the Panel to Resolution 1549] (describing the
occupation of Sapo National Park by ex-combatants engaging in illegal mining,
hunting and logging operations); Report of the Panel to Resolution 1478 Paragraph
25, supra note 183, 152 (alleging that MODEL was negotiating with a timber
company for resumption of logging in MODEL-controlled territory).
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able to reach all of the resource areas controlled by belligerents
before violent conflicts begin anew.
The first two steps in establishing security address short-
term solutions; however, an effective DDR program must be in
place to ensure long-term security. As its name suggests, DDR
involves disarmament (identifying ex-combatants, managing the
handing over of weapons, destroying the weapons),
demobilization (confining ex-combatants to a cantonment or
similar site for a period), reintegration (providing stipends for
resettlement expenses, transport to resettlement areas, basic
orientation and training, and short and long-term employment
opportunities).227 Achieving successful DDR is very difficult but
necessary to ensure that previously warring factions have little
incentive to reinitiate conflict.228 Part of this incentive relates to
controlling resource exploitation (the greed mechanism);
therefore, effective DDR allows the government to continue
peaceful supervision and control over natural resources,
allowing resource revenues to assist with the rebuilding effort
and not increase instability.
Establishing security over natural resources after the
comprehensive peace agreement in Liberia proceeded very
slowly and ineffectively at times. By March 2007, almost four
years after the end of the civil war, UNMIL and the Liberian
government still had not established complete control over all
major natural resource operations.229 Insufficient authority and
strength of the UNMIL forces and problems with the DDR
program were the primary causes of this slow progress.
Without "full executive authority to detain those undermining
peace or to enforce the sanctions," UNMIL was hampered in
limiting the recruitment and training of future insurgents.23 °
This limited mandate resulted in an inability to control looting
and exploitation of natural resource operations by former
227. See First Progress Report, supra note 107, 23.
228. See STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 4, at 165-66.
229. See Fourteenth Progress Report, supra note 111, 31 (noting that security
is still a serious concern at two rubber plantations, Cocopa and Sinoe); see also
Report of the Panel to Resolution 1731, supra note 114, 71 (describing in June 2007
the continuing growth of an illegal mining settlement, its danger to public health,
and Liberia and UNMIL's inability to deal with the situation). By August 2007,
security had improved at Cocopa, but ex-combatants still controlled the Sinoe
plantation and continued to extract rubber illegally. See Fifteenth Progress Report,
supra note 115, 51. The Secretary General also noted continued illegal mining by
ex-combatants, foreigners and unemployed youth in August 2007. Id. 50.
230. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1579, supra note 226, 10; see also Report
of the Panel to Resolution 1549, supra note 226, 13.
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combatants. 3' Lacking a mandate to assist Liberia's Ministry of
Lands, Mines and Energy in the control of the diamond sector,
the UNMIL has continually failed to prevent increased levels of
illegal mining in Liberia's interior.232
Exacerbating the lack of authority was the slow deployment
of peacekeeping forces. As of December 12, 2003, UNMIL troop
strength stood at only 5,900 military personnel out of an
authorized 15,000, prompting frustration from the Secretary-
General that slippage in the deployment schedule would harm
the DDR program and efforts to deploy beyond Monrovia. 33
Even when UNMIL strength later increased, the forces failed to
deploy fully throughout Liberia and, in those areas where they
were deployed, patrolled only the main towns and roads.234
UNMIL did not achieve complete deployment of military troops
to all fifteen counties until June 2005, almost two years after
the mission began.235 The failure to deploy quickly throughout
the country enabled ex-combatants to retain control of some
mining, timber, and rubber operations, sometimes resulting in
violent disturbances.236
UNMIL had extensive plans in place for the DDR program
at the outset of mission operations.237  The DDR efforts
eventually achieved a large amount of success, but were riddled
with numerous problems along the way. An early DDR exercise
was overwhelmed by over 12,000 ex-combatants, resulting in
brief riots over misunderstandings concerning benefits.238 After
a brief suspension in DDR efforts, the program resumed with
new conditions, but some violent riots still ensued and the
Secretary-General expressed concern over the low number of
weapons surrendered.239 The failure of UNMIL to deploy quickly
beyond Monrovia also contributed to frustration among
231. See, e.g., Report of the Panel to Resolution 1579, supra note 226, 99;
Report of the Panel to Resolution 1549, supra note 226, 7 118, Report of the Panel to
Resolution 1521, supra note 192, 101.
232. See Report of the Panel to Resolution 1731, supra note 114, 71; Report of
the Panel to Resolution 1647, supra note 152, 54-62, 66.
233. First Progress Report, supra note 107, $T 6-7.
234. See, e.g., Second Progress Report, supra note 109, T 4; Report of the Panel to
Resolution 1521, supra note 192, 77 24-25.
235. See Seventh Progress Report, supra note 111, 15.
236. See, e.g., id. 20; Sixth Progress Report, supra note 111, 17; Report of the
Panel to Resolution 1579, supra note 226, T$ 30-31; Report of the Panel to Resolution
1549, supra note 226, 29.
237. See First Progress Report, supra note 107, 77 21-29.
238. See, e.g., id. 9; Second Progress Report, supra note 109, 19.
239. See Third Progress Report, supra note 111, 17 17, 19.
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combatants, leading to further civil unrest.2" Lack of funding
plagued the DDR program as many reintegration opportunities
remained only ideas.24 ' The lack of reintegration opportunities
and incomplete reach of DDR efforts made illicit natural
resource exploitation an attractive and perhaps necessary
option for many ex-combatants.242 As of March 2007, about
75,000 out of 101,874 demobilized ex-combatants had completed,
were participating in, or were registered for reintegration
programs; however, this left significant numbers still waiting
for reintegration opportunities.243 If these DDR efforts are not
ultimately successful, there is a strong potential that greed or
necessity will draw many possible belligerents back into the
illegal natural resource trade, therefore making long-term
security a difficult prospect.2"
3. Promoting Effective Internal Governance
While security is being established, the stability forces and
the transitional government can begin work on longer-term
240. See The Secretary-General, Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General
on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, 9 8, delivered to the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/2004/725 (Sept. 10, 2004).
241. See Sixth Progress Report, supra note 111, 26.
242. See Eighth Progress Report, supra note 111, $T 18, 28 (describing how over
20,000 people, many ex-combatants moved to an area following the discovery of
diamonds, resulting in a devastating cholera outbreak and how ex-combatants
allegedly excluded from DDR efforts retained control of the Guthrie rubber
plantation). See also Report of the Panel to Resolution 1760, supra note 155, T 151
(citing a September-December 2006 study finding several hundred ex-combatants
involved in the illegal management and exploitation of the Guthrie Rubber
Plantation).
243. See Fourteenth Progress Report, supra note 111, 25.
244. In August 2007, the Secretary General reported that many Liberians
believe that the "reintegration program has failed to provide sustainable alternative
livelihoods for ex-combatants." Fifteenth Progress Report, supra note 115, 32.
Thousands of these ex-combatants "have regrouped for the purpose of illegally
exploiting natural resources in diamond and gold mining areas, as well as on rubber
plantations." Id. See also Report of the Panel to Resolution 1731, supra note 114,
142-43 (noting that illegal mining and rubber tapping continues). Ex-combatants in
Liberia are also exacerbating regional instability. See, e.g., id. 146-51
(describing the involvement of Liberian ex-combatants in Guinea's internal conflict).
While about 70 percent of ex-combatants who received training under the official
UNMIL DDR program considered themselves unemployed or underemployed in
December 2006, this could also be largely because of the general economic situation
in Liberia-with unemployment rates above 80 percent among the general
population. See Report of the Panel to Resolution 1760, supra note 155, 146-47.
Therefore, revitalizing Liberia's economy generally is as important as effective DDR
programs.
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internal natural resource governance. Intervening forces should
focus on five areas regarding natural resources and state
governance in the post-conflict period: tracking resources,
establishing adequate natural resources capacity and
infrastructure, determining appropriate resource property
rights, enacting legislative reforms, and controlling government
corruption. As this article focuses on the role of the
multinational force, this subsection will only address the first
two areas.245
The effective tracking of resources involves chain of custody
and certificate of origin regimes. The foremost example of this
is the internal controls that must be implemented to join the
Kimberley Process. The Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme for rough diamonds represents the culmination of a
number of meetings on an international certification scheme for
diamonds that would address the sale of conflict diamonds
financing rebel activities, especially in Africa.2" The Security
Council strongly supported this Scheme "as a valuable
245. Effective allocation of property rights over natural resources is also a
crucial consideration for internal governance; however, this is best left to the new
state government as property rights must be addressed on a long-term basis through
all branches of government. For an article exploring the ownership of natural
resources, see Duruigbo, supra note 41 passim. Secondly, legislative reform,
including the passage of new environmental and natural resource laws, is critical to
natural resource governance but again is best left to the state government and not
the intervening forces. For a good overview of the progression of forestry laws in
Liberia, see ENVTL. LAW INST. ET AL., LAWS AND REGULATIONS RELATED TO
FORESTRY IN LIBERIA, http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/31586/en (last visited Feb. 1,
2008). Finally, controlling government corruption is an important part of the larger
effort to provide for effective governance. See Ninth Progress Report, supra note 112,
7 52-57. If government officials are receiving bribes or other incentives to allow
the continuance of illegal operations, reformation and rebuilding of the government
will not occur. Id. Part of controlling corruption is providing incentives to officials
to resist the corruption, such as through adequate wages and through strict legal
penalties. Id. In September 2005, international donors and the NTG agreed to
implementation of the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program
(GEMAP) that contains provisions intended to increase accountability and
transparency in public revenues and projects and increase government capacity to
deal with corruption. Since her election, President Johnson Sirleaf has been taking
active steps to address the issues of corruption and bad governance in Liberia. See,
e.g., Report of the Panel to Resolution 1760, supra note 155, 16; Fourteenth
Progress Report, supra note 111, 7; Thirteenth Progress Report, supra note 114, 7
6-7, Twelfth Progress Report, supra note 111, 7, Tenth Progress Report, supra note
113, 4-7; GLOBAL WITNESS, CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC: THE CASE FOR
MAINTAINING SANCTIONS IN LIBERIA 8-9 (June 2006), http://www.globalwitness.org/
medialibrary-get.php/259/Global%2OWitness%2OJune%202006%2OReport.pdf.
246. Koyame, supra note 60, at 95-97.
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contribution against trafficking in conflict diamonds .... ,247
Launched in January 2003, the Kimberley Process requires
governments to certify that shipments of rough diamonds are
free from blood diamonds. Countries that participate must pass
legislation to enforce the Kimberley Process. They must also set
up control systems for the import and export of rough diamonds.
Participants are only allowed to trade rough diamonds with
other participants.248
To comply with the Kimberley Process, States must
establish a chain of custody for the diamonds from the point of
mining to the point of export.249 While not implemented in
binding international agreements, chain of custody schemes
have also been proposed for timber products. 5 ° Some schemes
already exist in the international commercial realm, such as
that required by the Forestry Stewardship Council.25' Effective
chain of custody schemes for natural resources can help the new
government build confidence with potential investors and meet
benchmarks that are often tied to sanctions.
Nations involved with stability efforts can play a limited,
albeit crucial, role in the tracking of natural resources. The
majority of work must be done through the passage and
enforcement of laws by the new government. However,
multinational forces can assist with funding of certification
efforts, training of officials, surveys of resources, and control of
resource areas. All of these efforts can be seen in the case of
Liberia. In January 2006, the U.S. disbursed US$1.4 million to
assist Liberia in making a successful application to participate
in the Kimberley Process.252  UNMIL staff also served as
247. S.C. Res. 1459, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1459/58 (Jan. 28, 2003).
248. GLOBAL WITNESS, THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS AT RISK, BRIEFING DOCUMENT
1 (2006), http://www.globalwitness.org/data/files/media library/6/enlthekimberley_
process.at._risk.pdf. As of November 2006, 71 countries had met the minimum
requirements of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. Id. The Clean
Diamond Trade Act is the legislation passed to bring the U.S. within compliance. See
Koyame, supra note 60, at 98-99.
249. CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC, supra note 245, at 18.
250. See Salo, supra note 184, at 143-44.
251. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1478, supra note 145, at 29 box 3.
252. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1647, supra note 152, 33-34. Managed
through an international consultancy, Futures Group, this money went to:
developing internal control structures and databases necessary for Kimberley
Process certification, training mining inspectors and evaluators, performing
geological surveys, supporting the organization of cooperative schemes for artisanal
alluvial miners, and coordinating a process for valuation of export shipments of
rough diamonds. Id. The US, through the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) also funded an independent valuator in September through
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representatives at the Kimberley Process in place of Liberian
officials.253  Despite the international assistance, Liberia's
government proceeded very slowly in establishing its chain of
custody schemes. Liberia only very recently achieved a system
adequate to satisfy the lifting of diamond sanctions,254 and the
government is working on a chain of custody system for
timber.255  The main problem was a lack of capacity and
infrastructure necessary to implement any controls.256
Establishing adequate government capacity and
infrastructure to control natural resources is somewhat like
establishing security; little progress can be made in a post-
conflict country without addressing this fundamental area. Just
as multinational intervening forces must have adequate
strength and authority to secure and maintain peace, state
governments must have sufficient and functioning state
institutions to ensure natural resources contribute to, not
detract from, rebuilding efforts. The effort to rebuild state
natural resource institutions is integral to the overall effort in
rebuilding the rule of law after intervention. 7 Any successful
effort to rebuild state institutions must address issues of
funding, staffing (numbers and qualifications), incentives to
work (wages), political will, security, and regional and local
dispersion of institutions.
Liberia's experiences demonstrate the importance of each of
these issues. In June 2004, the Forestry Development
December 2007 to provide third-party assessment of diamonds in the Government
Diamond Office. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1760, supra note 155, 24.
253. U.N. Panel of Experts on Liberia, Report of the Panel of Experts, Submitted
Pursuant to Paragraph 14(e) of Security Council Resolution 1607 (2005), Concerning
Liberia, 35, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/745 (Dec. 7, 2005)
[hereinafter Report of the Panel to Resolution 1607].
254. S.C. Res. 1753, supra note 132.
255. See U.N. Panel of Experts on Liberia, Report of the Panel of Experts
Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1689 (2006),
Concerning Liberia, 57, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/976
(Dec. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Report of the Panel to Resolution 1689]. A chain-of-
custody management firm was to be appointed in late 2007 to maintain "a tracking
system that follows trees from forest to sale to ensure that no illegal wood enters the
legal supply chain and that, prior to export, all the proper taxes and fees are
collected." Report of the Panel to Resolution 1731, supra note 114, 38. The FDA
negotiated a contract to manage this chain of custody system with SGS Group,
signing a contract on October 31, 2007. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1760,
supra note 155, 79.
256. CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC, supra note 245, at 18.
257. Cf. STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 4, at 178-248 (describing the challenge of
justice system reform in building the rule of law after intervention).
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Authority did not function outside of Monrovia due to security
concerns, some regional FDA offices were destroyed by looters,
FDA staff had not been paid since February 2004, the regional
offices lacked equipment, and the FDA regional staff lacked
adequate training, resulting in a lack of capacity to monitor and
police the timber industry.258 Even with money later provided to
reopen its regional offices, the FDA did not deploy employees
into the field until the spring of 2005 because of concerns for
their security.259 Lack of funds to the FDA had a number of
effects. Having not been paid since November 2004, FDA staff
went on a short strike in May 2005.260 The nonpayment of
wages was a pattern and gave FDA officers little incentive to
actively enforce forestry policies. Despite a temporary ban on
pit-sawing, the domestic processing of logs continued,
sometimes with explicit approval of FDA officers for a fee.26'
While the FDA complained about a lack of capacity, pit-sawyers
complained that regional FDA staff were not carrying out their
management responsibilities, but instead were extracting
bribes.262 The failure of effective FDA control could be seen
when Sapo National Park-Liberia's only national park-was
invaded by more than 4,000 illegal gold miners and bushmeat
hunters.263 The FDA (with the assistance of UNMIL and other
organizations) did not succeed in evicting the squatters until
about six months later.'" It was not until 2006, with support of
international donors and UNMIL, that the FDA was eventually
able to achieve some effective control over logging, resulting in
the enactment of a new national forestry reform law, the lifting
of logging sanctions, and the beginnings of restarting large-scale
commercial logging in Liberia.265 However, as of June 2007,
258. E.g., Report of the Panel to Resolution 1521, supra note 192, 106; Report
of the Panel to Resolution 1478, supra note 145, 90.
259. See Report of the Panel to Resolution 1579, supra note 226, 129.
260. Id. 135.
261. See id. 121-28.
262. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1607, supra note 253, 70.
263. E.g., Report of the Panel to Resolution 1579, supra note 226, 130; Report
of the Panel to Resolution 1549, supra note 226, 29.
264. See, e.g., Eighth Progress Report, supra note 111, 67; Report of the Panel
to Resolution 1607, supra note 253, 65.
265. See, e.g., Fourteenth Progress Report, supra note 111, 28; Thirteenth
Progress Report, supra note 114, 23-24. However, at the time the Security
Council lifted timber sanctions, there were concerns that Liberia's timber industry
was insufficiently reformed. See Press Release, Global Witness, U.N. Security
Council Lifts Liberia Timber Sanctions Despite Insufficient Reform of the Industry
(June 22, 2006), http://www.globalwitness.org/mediajlibrary-detail.php/448/en
unitednationssecuritycounciljliftsliberiatimb.
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FDA regional offices were still not fully functioning and rural
policing of timber producing areas remained a challenge,
necessitating continued UNMIL security in rural areas.266
Mining sector government institutions experienced similar
problems. The Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy also lacked
functional capacity to control illegal mining in the interior,
struggling with this problem through the end of 2006.267 The
pay of mining inspectors was low enough that more lucrative
incentives could alter the exercise of their responsibilities.268
This was shown when some local mining officials allegedly
engaged in the illegal sale of mining permits.269 Including its
latest report, the Panel of Experts has continually pointed out
the lack of capacity of the Ministry.2 ° Despite these problems,
Liberia was able to eventually rebuild its mining infrastructure
enough to satisfy the Security Council's conditions for an end to
diamond sanctions in 2007.271 After the lifting of sanctions and
the visit of a Kimberley Process expert mission, Liberia was
admitted as a participant in the Kimberley Process on May 4,
2007, and the Liberian government removed its own ban on
diamond mining in Julyof 2007.272
266. See Report of the Panel to Resolution 1731, supra note 114, 35. Joint FDA
and UNMIL patrols in late 2007 found evidence of illegal pit-sawing in all forest
sectors and rangers at Sapa National Park have been attacked on at least two
occasions in 2007. Report of the Panel to Resolution 1760, supra note 155, 77 90-91.
The Panel of Experts has expressed concern that an ineffective judicial system may
be contributing to the uncontrolled use of forest resources. Id. at 92 ("Even where
FDA officers are able to be effective in making arrests, the judicial system and other
officials do not appear to support these actions. FDA staff claim that at least 40
people arrested in Sapo National Park since May 2006 were released by various
courts within a week of arrest.").
267. See, e.g., Thirteenth Progress Report, supra note 114, T 25; Twelfth Progress
Report, supra note 111, 7 37; Tenth Progress Report, supra note 113, 7 32; Eighth
Progress Report, supra note 111, 64; Report of the Panel to Resolution 1549, supra
note 226, 7 97, 101.
268. See Report of the Panel to Resolution 1607, supra note 253, 24.
269. Ninth Progress Report, supra note 112, T 59. In March 2007, "the Deputy
Minister and an assistant minister in the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy were
relieved of their posts for allegedly granting bogus mining licenses." Fifteenth
Progress Report, supra note 115, 1 4.
270. See, e.g., Report of the Panel to Resolution 1760, supra note 155, TT 55-60;
Report of the Panel to Resolution 1689, supra note 255, 7 31-32; Report of the Panel
to Resolution 1647, supra note 152, 7 54.
271. See S.C. Res. 1753, supra note 132 (noting that the continued lifting of
sanctions is conditional on Kimberley Process certification and the results of the
June 2007 report of the Panel of Experts).
272. Fifteenth Progress Report, supra note 115, 50. "The Government obtained
its Kimberley Process Certification Scheme certificates in late July 2007 and
announced the end of its moratorium on diamond mining on 26 July 2007 ....
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In both forestry and mining operations, when government
authorities demonstrated "a lack of political will to implement
measures for the proper control and management of the
country's natural resources and to ensure that revenues from
these resources are used for the public good," UNMIL provided
advice, conducted monitoring, and assisted with security.73
This is exactly what a stability force must do. As evidenced by
Liberia's experiences, the establishment of effective internal
government controls can proceed slowly; therefore, the stability
force must be ready to step in and help prod the government
toward success.
V. CONCLUSION
Regional stability in West Africa depends largely on the
outcomes of the peace processes in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and
Cote d'Ivoire. A large part of ensuring sustainable peace in
these countries and others experiencing violent internal conflict
is through effective management of natural resources after the
cessation of hostilities. While consideration of natural resources
is not the only factor in building an effective post-conflict
society, it is one of the most important, and ignoring it creates
conditions that may inevitably pull the country back into civil
war.
UNMIL's experiences in Liberia demonstrate the need to
consider natural resources issues early in the planning process
and to regularly reevaluate the effectiveness of particular
measures. Before any nation or multinational organization
determines whether intervention may be appropriate, it must
examine the natural resource issues particular to the country
experiencing civil strife. Only through adequate study of
resource issues (along with many other issues) can the possible
intervener determine whether and how to intervene. If the
organization or state does decide to intervene, it must ensure
that it enters peacekeeping operations with an explicit natural
resources mandate providing sufficient authority to establish
security in resource exploitation areas. The establishment of
Report of the Panel to Resolution 1760, supra note 155, 26. By the end of October
2007, the Government had issued 108 diamond mining licenses, thirteen broker
licenses, and twelve dealer licenses, and issued certificates for nine shipments of
diamonds between September and October 2007 totaling over 14,000 carats and
approximately US$1.85 million. Id. at 27-28.
273. See Seventh Progress Report, supra note 111, 1 55-56.
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security in those areas must be done quickly and with sufficient
force. Delays in the deployment of security forces only allows
ex-combatants to entrench themselves with resource revenues
and build their capabilities to spoil peacekeeping operations.
Although a very difficult task, the intervening force must
provide for an effective DDR program to ensure that ex-
combatants will not have incentives to resume conflict,
especially through illicit trade in natural resources. Finally, the
intervening force must help with the transitional government's
efforts to establish effective internal governance of natural
resources in areas such as the tracking of resources and building
of central government capacity and infrastructure.
This article has only addressed a fraction of the natural
resource issues involved in establishing the rule of law and
maintaining peace after military interventions. Other issues
include economic issues, international legal frameworks
(sanctions, foreign aid, international environmental agreements,
international business practices, and rules), government
corruption, property rights, and legislative reform. Many other
natural resources may feature in different countries, such as
petroleum, coffee, cocoa, opium, copper, and other minerals.
Different resources will call for different approaches. While this
article only serves as a starting point for examining the role of
natural resource governance in conflict areas, it highlights a
critical component of effective intervention policy that has been
too often overlooked.

